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How to define and use the concept of inclusive fitness is a contentious topic in evolutionary theory. 
Inclusive fitness can be used to calculate selection on a focal gene, but it is also applied to whole 
organisms. Individuals are then predicted to appear designed as if to maximise their inclusive 
fitness, provided that certain conditions are met (formally when interactions between individuals are 
‘additive’). Here we argue that applying the concept of inclusive fitness to organisms is justified 
under far broader conditions than previously shown, but only if it is appropriately defined. 
Specifically, we propose that organisms should maximise the sum of their offspring (including any 
accrued due to the behaviour/phenotype of relatives), plus any effects on their relatives’ offspring 
production, weighted by relatedness. In contrast, most theoreticians have argued that a focal 
individual’s inclusive fitness should exclude any offspring accrued due to the behaviour of 
relatives. Our approach is based on the notion that long-term evolution follows the genome’s 
‘majority interest’ of building coherent bodies that are efficient ‘vehicles’ for gene propagation. A 
gene favoured by selection that reduces the propagation of unlinked genes at other loci (e.g. meiotic 
segregation distorters that lower sperm production) is eventually neutralised by counter-selection 
throughout the rest of the genome. Most phenotypes will therefore appear as if designed to 
maximise the propagation of any given gene in a focal individual and its relatives. 
Perhaps we should not feel entirely confident about generalizing our principle until a more 
comprehensive mathematical argument, with inclusive fitness more widely defined, has been 
worked out. – Hamilton [1] 
1. Introduction 
What, if anything, are organisms shaped by evolution adapted to achieve [2–4]? To answer this 
question, consider the fact that natural selection is roughly analogous to trial-and-error learning: 
mutations create gene variants which affect the phenotypes of organisms expressing them; variants 
then spread if their causal effects on the world, mediated by how they affect the phenotype, aid their 
propagation [5]. Accordingly, it is a truism that any naturally selected trait can be said to have 
evolved because genes contributing to the trait in past generations were more successful than their 
alternatives at leaving copies in the present. But what kinds of phenotypes will successful genes 
contribute to build? Hamilton made a major breakthrough in answering this question [6,7]. He 
distinguished two causal pathways by which a gene, expressed in a given organism, can aid its 
propagation. It can enhance the organism’s own reproduction (direct fitness), and it can cause the 
organism to enhance the reproduction of others that carry the gene’s identical copies (indirect 
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fitness). To capture this insight, he defined inclusive fitness (𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*) as a combined measure of 
direct and indirect fitness components [6]:  
“Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an individual actually expresses in 
its production of adult offspring as it becomes after it has been first stripped and then augmented in 
a certain way. It is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the individual’s 
social environment, leaving the fitness which he would express if not exposed to any of the harms 
or benefits of that environment. This quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of the 
quantities of harm and benefit which the individual himself causes to the fitnesses of his 
neighbours. The fractions in question are simply the coefficients of relationship appropriate to the 
neighbours whom he affects: unity for clonal individuals, one-half for sibs, one-quarter for half-
sibs, one-eighth for cousins, ... and finally zero for all neighbours whose relationship can be 
considered negligibly small”.  
Hamilton showed that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* works as a genetic accounting tool to predict when a focal gene is 
positively selected, which occurs when an individual expressing it enjoys increased inclusive 
fitness. He inferred from this that the long-term outcome of successive genes being selected in this 
way is that organisms shaped by natural selection should be adapted to maximise 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*. This 
would make 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* a phenotypic maximand [3]. The concept of a phenotypic maximand is 
useful for studying adaptation because we can then envisage individual organisms as maximising 
agents with a defined biological purpose [8]. It allows us to predict that an organism’s (naturally 
selected) traits tend to be shaped to cause a higher expected value of the maximand than feasible 
alternative traits. Organism-centred usage of inclusive fitness requires that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*	is a 
measurable property of an individual organism. To meet this requirement, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* must use a 
concept of relatedness that is applicable to entire organisms (i.e., that approximately measures 
genetic similarity across the genome), rather than being only applicable to one gene at a time. 
By contrast, inclusive fitness models often focus on a single gene, predicting that it will spread if it 
satisfies Hamilton’s rule 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0 (where r is relatedness, −𝑐 and 𝑏 are changes caused to the 
reproduction of ‘self’ and ‘other’, and the left-hand-side is defined as the gene’s inclusive fitness 
effect [6,9]). This approach calls for a gene-specific (‘genic’) definition of relatedness [10] which – 
unlike ‘pedigree relatedness’ between organisms – accounts for genetic similarity between 
individuals for a focal gene that can arise by processes that do not apply equally to all genes (e.g. 
non-random assortment of organisms with the focal gene). This difference in relatedness concepts 
indicates that the connection between gene-level selection and organism-level adaptation is not 
straightforward. Indeed, some theorists have even concluded that inclusive fitness is not a 
meaningful property of an organism [11–13]. If true, this precludes it being a phenotypic maximand 
(but see [3,9]). But do we really want to abandon the use of inclusive fitness when we study 
adaptations, which are usually complex traits determined by the effects of many genes?  
Here we argue that invoking 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* as a general phenotypic maximand is problematic, but that 
these problems are surmounted if we redefine inclusive fitness. We start from the observation that 
genes with opposing phenotypic effects can simultaneously be selected for, due to gene-specific 
patterns of inheritance and expression (e.g. meiotic driver genes versus those for balanced meiosis). 
We then invoke a broad interpretation of the principle of the ‘parliament of genes’ [14] to predict 
how such opposing forces are likely to be resolved over evolutionary time. To operationally 
characterise the genome’s ‘majority interest’, we invoke an idealised ‘reference gene’ whose 
interest in which phenotype is expressed always aligns with that of most other genes in the same 
organism. We then propose a modified definition of inclusive fitness based on a quantity whose 
maximisation best serves the genome’s ‘majority interest’. Our goal is not to paint a precise picture 
of population genetic processes, but rather to argue for a higher-level principle that tends to guide 
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cumulative phenotypic evolution in a coherent direction: namely, towards optimised design of 
individual organisms.  
We consider a wide range of potential objections to our approach, which is likely to be 
controversial. However, to avoid too many asides, we relegate many of these objections to a 
‘Questions and Answers’ list (Supplementary Material). We also include a video that gives a non-
technical overview of our ideas. 
  
2. Reference genes and the parliament of genes  
Any quantity that qualifies as a phenotypic maximand should tend to be increased through 
phenotypic changes induced by gene frequency changes due to natural selection. But, of course, 
organisms are integrated units shaped by selection on thousands of loci over long timespans, so not 
every positively selected gene needs to be a step towards increasing the maximand. Once a focal 
gene has spread and propelled a population along an evolutionary trajectory in phenotypic space, 
genetic variation at other loci determines how the trajectory continues. The focal gene’s 
contribution could either be retained or eliminated. When studying long-term evolution, the 
common guiding question: “what kind of gene will be positively selected?” should therefore be 
complemented by adding “…, such that its phenotypic effect is not eliminated in the long run”. A 
similar point was made by Leigh [14] to account for fair meiosis being overwhelmingly common, 
despite the huge selective advantage that segregation distorter genes can enjoy. Leigh wrote: “It is 
as if we had to do with a parliament of genes: each acts in its own self-interest, but if its acts hurt 
others, they will combine together to suppress it.” He explained the rarity of segregation distorters 
by invoking the principle that genes that oppose the genome’s ‘majority interest’ are eliminated by 
counter-selection at other loci. Here we combine this idea with Dawkins’ [4] vision of individual 
organisms as vehicles for gene propagation. Specifically, we postulate that the genome’s ‘majority 
interest’ is to build an organism with high vehicle quality, which we define as an organism’s general 
capacity to propagate its genes and their identical copies. To quantify vehicle quality we envisage a 
hypothetical reference gene (more precisely, an allele) which is: (i) present in the focal organism, 
(ii) rare in the population (iii) subject to Mendelian inheritance, and (iv) rarely or never expressed 
(i.e. low penetrance; assuming that other alleles at the same locus are never expressed). These 
properties are chosen in part (i, ii) to facilitate measuring gene propagation (essentially, by counting 
copies), and in part (iii, iv) so that the reference gene’s evolutionary interest as to what phenotype 
should be expressed (i.e. the ranking of possible phenotypes with respect to how well they 
propagate the reference gene) aligns with the common interest of the organism’s other genes.  
We measure vehicle quality as the number of reference gene copies that can be causally attributed 
to the focal organism. These are the net number of additional copies that arise because the focal 
organism exists. Every sexually produced offspring of the focal organism contributes s copies, and 
every offspring produced by a relative of degree r accounts for sr copies. Here, s is the probability 
of transmitting a reference gene copy to a given offspring, which is given by the focal organism’s 
consanguinity [15] with itself; in diploid, outbreeding populations, 𝑠 = 0.5. The pedigree 
relatedness r is the coefficient of relatedness [15] as applied to weakly selected genes due to 
coancestry. The number of propagated reference gene copies then sums to 𝑠 ∙ ∑(𝑟 ∙ 𝛥𝑛;), where 𝛥𝑛; is the net number of offspring1 produced (or not produced) by relatives of degree r because the 
focal organism exists. It includes all of the focal organism’s own offspring, for which 𝑟 = 1. An 
individual’s vehicle quality is maximised by the phenotype that causes the greatest representation of 
the reference gene in future generations. This occurs when the individual maximises the expected 
value of ∑(𝑟 ∙ 𝛥𝑛;), which is the sum of its own offspring number, plus its effects on its relatives’ 
                                               
1 To be exact, to quantify each reference gene copy’s projected contribution to the future gene pool, each offspring 
should be weighted by V/l, where reproductive value V is the offspring’s projected contribution to the future gene pool, 
and ploidy level l accounts for the fact that a diploid offspring’s contribution is shared between two haploid genomes. 
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number of offspring, weighted by relatedness. We call this the folk definition of inclusive fitness, 𝐼𝐹>)'?, which has been described as “a common misdefinition of inclusive fitness” [16]. Unlike 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* there is no ‘stripping’ of the social environment for 𝐼𝐹>)'?. That is, all of the focal 
individual’s own offspring count as being caused by it, in the sense that they would not have been 
produced if the focal organism hadn’t existed and exhibited a phenotype with the requisite fertility.  
To summarise, we postulate that the genome’s ‘majority interest’ is to build an organism with high 
vehicle quality. Here, vehicle quality is the general capacity for gene propagation, which we 
propose to quantify as the number of reference gene copies that can be causally attributed to the 
organism. Since that number is proportional to 𝐼𝐹>)'?, the number of reference gene copies is 
maximised when 𝐼𝐹>)'? is maximised. So, if evolution mainly follows the genome’s majority 
interest, organisms should express traits that maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'?. The reference gene’s property of 
being rarely expressed (hence weakly selected) justifies using a pedigree-based concept of 
relatedness for 𝐼𝐹>)'?, which is also relevant for multi-locus evolution because coancestry is the 
only source of genetic similarity that promotes wide agreement across the genome as to what traits 
best serve each constituent gene’s propagation [3,10].  
What do we mean when we claim that organisms should behave so as to maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'?? In 
general, maximization occurs when a mathematical or physical function reaches its highest 
achievable output value through changes, within a specified range, in the values of its input 
arguments. In the present case, the function of interest is 𝐼𝐹>)'?, and its argument is the individual 
organism’s phenotypic strategy (including its propensity to help or harm, but also non-social traits). 
Formally we can write this as 𝐼𝐹>)'?[𝜋] = ∑(𝑟 ∙ 𝛥𝑛;) |𝑑𝑜(𝑝ℎ𝑒𝑛𝑜𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 = 𝜋), where the ‘do’ 
operator (adopted from Pearl’s causal modelling framework [17,18]) stands for ‘set phenotype to 𝜋’. This formulation conveys the idea that any given phenotype belongs to a set of feasible options 
that could be generated by appropriate genotypes, or by experimental intervention. We then predict 
that organisms tend to exhibit phenotypes that yield higher 𝐼𝐹>)'? than feasible alternatives. 
Crucially, while 𝐼𝐹>)'? is useful for comparing phenotypes at a given time, in a given social 
environment, it does not measure changes in absolute fit between organisms and their environment 
over evolutionary time. Hence our prediction that phenotypes yielding higher 𝐼𝐹>)'? tend to evolve 
should not be misinterpreted as a claim that 𝐼𝐹>)'? increases over evolutionary time, towards a 
maximum at equilibrium. The environment that sets the background for evaluating 𝐼𝐹>)'? changes 
over time due to both abiotic and biotic factors, including frequency-dependent traits.  
3. Rogue genes  
Despite the parliament of genes, selection need not always increase vehicle quality. At least in the 
short term, the opposite can occur. Here we use the term rogue genes for genes that can generate 
selection for traits that reduce vehicle quality. Rogue genes include Mendelian outlaw genes, 
greenbeard genes, and a previously undescribed type that we call mirror effect rogue genes. The 
existence of these kinds of genes is partly why some theoreticians are dubious about the usefulness 
of applying inclusive fitness to individual organisms. Mendelian outlaw genes spread at the expense 
of unlinked genes in the same organism by violating the laws of Mendelian inheritance. A meiotic 
drive gene that ends up in more than half of an organism’s zygotes may spread, despite reducing the 
organism’s reproductive output. However, a driver gene also selects for unlinked modifier genes 
that neutralise its phenotypic effect [19]. Greenbeard genes can spread by causing their bearer to (i) 
exhibit an cue (e.g. a green beard), and (ii) behave altruistically towards others bearing the cue 
[4,20]. Once a greenbeard gene has spread, the maintenance of its phenotypic effects relies on the 
genetic constraint that the cue (which enhances vehicle quality) cannot be expressed without the 
altruistic behaviour (which reduces vehicle quality). Eventually this constraint should be 
undermined through selection for modifier genes that suppress the altruistic behaviour, but not the 
cue [21,22]. Mirror effect rogue genes are particularly pertinent to deciding whether 𝐼𝐹>)'? qualifies 
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as a phenotypic maximand, but we defer their definition until Section 5 as we must first introduce 
some additional concepts.  
4. The mirror effect  
There is a conceptual distinction between genes with and without a ‘mirror effect’. The ‘mirror 
effect’ is a gene’s tendency to be simultaneously expressed in interacting individuals that carry the 
gene. The term alludes to the idea that an individual expressing a gene with a mirror effect will tend 
to find its own phenotype ‘mirrored’ by relatives who share the gene. In an interaction between 
individuals who share a gene, the mirror effect’s strength is quantified as the conditional probability 
that the gene is expressed in the non-focal individual, given that it is expressed in the focal 
individual. When this probability is zero or negligibly small, we speak of a ‘gene without mirror 
effect’. Population genetic models (including Hamilton’s [6]) often assume that a gene is always 
expressed, thereby implicitly assuming the mirror effect is maximally strong. There are, however, 
two mechanisms by which a gene can be exempt from the mirror effect. First, if the expression of a 
behaviour is conditional on an asymmetry between social partners (e.g. in size, residency, caste, 
social dominance, or any arbitrary variable), the underlying gene is exempt from the mirror effect 
[23]. Second, if a gene has low penetrance (i.e., probability of being expressed) it will rarely be 
simultaneously expressed in both the actor and the recipient during a social interaction – even if 
both parties carry the gene. This makes the mirror effect negligibly weak. The mirror effect presents 
a difficulty for quantifying the causal effects of a gene because it is expressed both in a focal 
organism and in other organisms that make up its social environment (Fig. 1). For example, if we 
compare organisms that either do or do not have a helping gene (with mirror effect), 𝐼𝐹>)'? 
overestimates the gene’s causal effect because it counts the benefit of helping twice – both when 
giving and receiving help [16]. The conventional remedy for this ‘double accounting’ is to use 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, which, by ‘stripping’ the effect of the social environment, isolates the causal effect of a 
gene when it is expressed in the focal organism. However, inspired by Pearl’s causal modelling 
framework [17,18], we suggest an alternative remedy that is analogous to measuring causality in a 
controlled experiment. We can measure a gene’s causal effect on a focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? by 
comparing the observed value of 𝐼𝐹>)'? with the counterfactual value 𝐼𝐹K>)'? that would arise if the 
individual were experimentally prevented from expressing the gene (see legend to Fig. 1). This 
heuristic recovers the correct inclusive fitness effect when interactions are additive (i.e., when the 
effects of an individual’s actions are independent of the phenotype of others; Fig.1). As importantly, 
it also predicts the direction of multi-locus evolution for the kinds of non-additive interactions that 
have stymied attempts to ‘strip’ the effects of the social environment on the focal individual’s 
inclusive fitness (Supplementary Material 5, Q15). Instead of being a mere technicality that needs 
accounting for, the mirror effect can sometimes affect the direction of selection by biasing the flow 
of social benefits towards particular genotypes in non-additive interactions (i.e., when the benefits 
provided to a recipient partly depend on the recipient’s phenotype; Fig. 2). 
5. Mirror effect rogue genes 
Intriguingly, opposite phenotypes (e.g. help versus do not help) can be selected for depending on 
whether or not a gene has a mirror effect (Fig. 2). In this context we define a mirror effect rogue 
(MER) gene as an allele that reduces the vehicle quality of the organisms expressing it, but is still 
selected for due to the mirror effect (i.e. because the mirror effect biases the flow of social benefits 
towards particular genotypes at that locus). Here, an organism’s reduction in vehicle quality is 
measured relative to the counterfactual situation where only the focal organism, in its given social 
environment, expresses an alternative phenotype to that induced by the MER. This definition 
implies that any unlinked modifier gene will be selected for if it slightly reduces a MER gene’s 
probability of being expressed. This follows because the modifier gene meets our definition of a 
reference gene in being rarely expressed (only in rare instances where its effect on the MER gene is 
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realised), implying that more copies of it are propagated when the focal organism’s vehicle quality 
is increased (due to the MER gene’s negative effect being negated by the modifier). MER genes can 
occur when there are non-additive social interactions in which matching phenotypes interfere with 
each other (e.g. mutual help is less efficient than unilateral help; Supplementary material 1). 
Loosely speaking, these are conditions where a rational actor would prefer to help, unless she 
anticipates that her actions will be ‘mirrored’ by relatives. In the example given in Fig 2, helping 
increases vehicle quality when it is rare; however, a MER allele for ‘not helping’ can spread to 
fixation when the helping allele is always expressed (i.e. is subject to a mirror effect), thereby 
failing to generate indirect fitness benefits for its carriers due to interference. We should emphasize 
that MER genes do not merit discussion because there is empirical evidence for them, but rather 
because many theoretical models [24–27] have made assumptions under which MER genes occur. 
This has prompted conclusions which appear to contradict our prediction that evolution tends 
toward the maximisation of 𝐼𝐹>)'?.  
6. The folk definition of inclusive fitness 
Based on our definition of vehicle quality and 𝐼𝐹>)'? we advance a heuristic argument about 
cumulative change, and a deductive argument about evolutionary stability, to infer the most likely 
outcome of long-term natural selection. Consider a positively selected focal gene (of any effect size, 
hence subject to any strength of selection) for a trait that increases vehicle quality through an 
initially inefficient mechanism, as is likely for novel traits. Other genes elsewhere in the genome 
that enhance the trait’s efficiency will then increase vehicle quality further and be selected for. In 
this way, traits that increase vehicle quality have the potential to evolve through complementary, 
cumulative contributions from unlinked genes. This potential is crucial because many genes (with 
various effect sizes) are usually involved in producing finely adapted and/or complex traits. It is 
exceedingly rare for such traits to arise in a single mutational step. Conversely, if a focal gene 
promotes development of a trait that reduces vehicle quality while facilitating its own propagation 
(i.e., a rogue gene), the trait faces counter-selection from elsewhere in the genome. The likely 
success of the ‘parliament of genes’ in countering a rogue gene is aided by the architectural 
principle that complex structures are more easily destroyed than built. For example, if trait 
development depends on a suite of genes that interact in a coherent fashion, then mutations 
disrupting any of these myriad interactions will tend to derail its development. These twin 
considerations suggest that traits that increase vehicle quality will prevail in the long run, even if 
selection for rogue genes temporarily reverses the trend.  
We next make an argument about evolutionary stability. Consider a mutant gene whose expression 
in a focal individual induces a phenotypic change that increases the individual’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?. If this gene 
meets our definition of a reference gene, it is guaranteed to be positively selected because 𝐼𝐹>)'? is 
defined by a reference gene’s propagation success. Hence, no phenotypic strategy is evolutionarily 
stable unless the organisms adopting it already maximize their 𝐼𝐹>)'?. To reach this conclusion, all 
we need to assume is that mutations can arise with any degree of penetrance. Even if evolutionary 
dynamics are largely driven by high-penetrance genes under strong selection, evolutionary stability 
has to be evaluated allowing for mutant genes with any degree of penetrance. To the extent that the 
availability of suitable alleles poses a genetic constraint, even a low frequency of mutations should 
eventually overcome this constraint. Hammerstein [28] made a similar point about non-social 
evolution: “If genetic constraints keep a population away from a phenotypically adaptive state, 
there is a possibility for a new mutant allele to code for phenotypes that perform better than the 
population mean.” It follows that the maximisation of 𝐼𝐹>)'? is necessary for evolutionary stability 
under far broader conditions than have been previously reported [27], including non-additive 
interactions and mutations of various step sizes, both large and small.  
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We emphasise that the above argument neither assumes nor implies that low-penetrance genes are 
more important for evolutionary stability than high-penetrance genes. However, it is stability 
against low-penetrance mutations that implies organismal maximising behaviour. This is because a 
low-penetrance gene, when expressed, induces exactly the kind of change we envision in our 
definition of 𝐼𝐹>)'? being a function of phenotype: namely, there is a change in the focal organism 
but no correlated (mirrored) change in its social environment. The gene’s causal effect on its own 
propagation thus corresponds exactly to its causal effect on the focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?. And this 
correspondence ensures that only organisms that already maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'? cannot be modified 
by a low-penetrance gene to gain a propagation advantage.  
Although necessary, maximisation of 𝐼𝐹>)'? is not sufficient for evolutionary stability. Even when 𝐼𝐹>)'? is maximised and it cannot be increased by changing a focal organism’s phenotype in its 
current environment, a large-effect mutation with mirror effect might perturb the social 
environment so as to render a new phenotype optimal. For example, if there are synergistic benefits 
of mutual cooperation, cooperator genes with mirror effect can invade (and then increase 𝐼𝐹>)'? in 
the new local environment they create) even when unilateral switching to cooperation would 
decrease 𝐼𝐹>)'? (Supplementary Material 1).  
Earlier work that rejected the principle of 𝐼𝐹>)'? maximisation made the restrictive assumption that 
genes with incomplete penetrance and/or conditional expression do not exist [24,25]. Consequently, 
mutant genes could not change the phenotype of the individual they were expressed in without 
immediately facing a correlated change in relatives carrying the same gene. Given interference 
between matching phenotypes, which is when MER genes can arise, this prevented organisms from 
evolving the optimal phenotype for their social environment (see Figure 2). Here we show that 
equilibria established by MER genes (at which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is not maximised) are unstable against 
invasion by mutant genes without mirror effect, whereas the corresponding equilibria at which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is maximised are stable against mutant genes both with and without mirror effect 
(Supplementary Material 1). We then use simulations to show that the principle of 𝐼𝐹>)'? 
maximisation is realised ever more closely when the genetic system is more flexible 
(Supplementary Material 2). This flexibility can arise due to either a one-locus multi-allele system 
(Figure S1) or a multi-locus system (Figures S2-S4). Our results suggest that, barring permanent 
genetic constraints that seem biologically implausible, interference between matching phenotypes 
(that allows for MER genes) poses no unsurmountable impediment to organisms evolving the 
optimal phenotype for their environment in the long-term.  
7. Hamilton’s inclusive fitness 
Does maximising 𝐼𝐹>)'? instead of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* actually makes a difference? Do we really need to 
abandon 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*? To be a quantity which an individual could meaningfully be said to be 
maximising, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, like 𝐼𝐹>)'?, must be a function of an individual organism’s phenotype. This 
raises the question of how to interpret the ‘stripping procedure’ in Hamilton’s definition. Hamilton 
stated that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* is “stripped of all components which can be considered as due to [i.e., that are 
causal effects of] the individual’s social environment, leaving the fitness which he would express if 
not exposed to any of the harms or benefits of that environment.” We take this to mean that, if a 
non-focal individual performs a social act that causes the focal organism’s reproduction to change 
(compared to the counterfactual situation where it is not performed), then the magnitude of that 
change must be stripped from the focal individual’s IF. This worked in Hamilton’s original setup 
because the assumption of additive interactions ensures that every consequence is attributable to a 
single act and actor. Additivity ensures that the components to be stripped are unaffected by the 
focal organism. By contrast, non-additivity introduces the difficulty that causal effects of non-focal 
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individuals’ behaviour depend on a focal individual’s phenotype. There are at least three 
approaches to dealing with this challenge:  
(i) One approach to 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, which we used, is to apply the original stripping procedure. That is, 
if a non-focal individual performs an act that causes the focal organism’s reproduction to change 
(compared to if the act did not occur), then we calculate 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* as if this act did not occur (i.e. 
‘stripping’). This leads to the conclusion that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* fails as a phenotypic maximand, because it 
unduly neglects a component of reproductive success that the focal individual can influence. 
Creel’s paradox [12] neatly exemplifies the problem this creates when trying to account for 
obviously adaptive traits: 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* implies that it is better to be a helper than a breeder in a 
cooperative breeding system (Figure 3; Supplementary Material 3).  
(ii) Alternatively, anticipating the inadequacy of approach (i) to capture all of a focal organism’s 
causal effects, one might conclude that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* simply cannot be applied in non-additive 
situations. This might be called the ‘Grafen-Nowak approach’, e.g. after refs [9] (“the question of 
how to define inclusive fitness in the absence of additivity has not been settled, and so fundamental 
theory on the non-additive case can hardly yet begin”) and [29] (“since non-linear, synergistic 
phenomena cannot be attributed to individual actors, there is in general no meaningful way to 
define an individual’s inclusive fitness”).  
(iii) One can abandon the task of calculating 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* as a property of an organism, and instead 
calculate the inclusive fitness effect of a focal gene or trait. This can be done with methods such as 
neighbour-modulated fitness (Supplementary Material 4) that automatically ‘strip’ appropriate 
components of only the effects of a particular gene or trait. One version of this approach, called the 
Taylor-Frank method [30,31], is very useful for constructing models, albeit without directly 
engaging with the phenotypic maximand concept. Another version, called the ‘general form of 
Hamilton’s rule’ [32–34], defines a focal gene’s inclusive fitness effect so as to make it positive by 
definition for any positively selected gene – even if it is a rogue gene that lowers vehicle quality. 
Although this formulation creates the impression of selection having a coherent direction, it does 
not resolve the question of how the opposing phenotypic effects of rogue genes and other genes 
play out in evolutionary time.  
Approaches (i) and (ii) both support our conclusion that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* is not a general phenotypic 
maximand; and approach (i) makes it explicit why 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* fails. Approach (iii) is silent on what, 
if any, property of an organism qualifies as a phenotypic maximand, as it is unconcerned with 
calculating IF as a property of an organism. Unfortunately, this limitation is frequently obscured by 
the practice of equating the inclusive fitness effect (applicable to a gene or trait) with inclusive 
fitness itself.  
For example, consider a focal organism that produces X offspring, and causes its relatives of 
relatedness r to produce another Y offspring, by expressing several different traits. 𝐼𝐹>)'? is readily 
defined as X + rY. But what is the focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*? According to approach (i), we can 
answer this question by measuring the component to be stripped, as the change in the focal 
organism’s reproduction that would ensue from preventing all social acts of non-focal individuals. 
According to approach (ii), the question is meaningless unless all fitness interactions are additive, 
because the focal individual’s 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* is not defined in the general case. And according to 
approach (iii), we cannot answer the question as the components to be stripped will differ from trait 
to trait, yielding no overall measure of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* as a property of an individual.  
Although 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* is the orthodox way to define inclusive fitness, we conclude that it is only a 
phenotypic maximand when interactions are additive. It only applies when the number of offspring 
which the social environment causes an individual to produce is unaffected by any aspect of the 
focal individual’s phenotype that could be selected for [9]. In that special case, it makes no 
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difference whether we think of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* or 𝐼𝐹>)'? as being maximised: they are both maximised by 
the same strategy, a point which has been made in a more general form by Okasha & Martens [25]. 
8. Discussion 
The most profound achievement of evolutionary theory is to explain the origin of complex 
organismal design that was once attributed to supernatural creation. According to the theory of 
natural selection, complex design arises gradually because changes in numerous phenotypic 
dimensions, induced by many genes, are predominantly guided in a coherent direction. The guiding 
principle that gives directionality to this process was identified by Darwin [2] as “the improvement 
of each organic being in relation to its organic and inorganic conditions of life”, and refined by 
Hamilton [1,6] as the improvement of inclusive fitness. Here we have tried to emphasise and 
strengthen these core ideas by modifying some of the theory’s details. 
One of these modifications bears on the fiery debate between critics and defenders of inclusive 
fitness ignited by Nowak et al. [35]. As we see it, both sides of the controversy make some valid 
claims. The critics are correct that inclusive fitness, when defined as 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, is a meaningful 
property of individual organisms (and hence a candidate phenotypic maximand) only under narrow 
conditions. But the defenders of inclusive fitness are equally correct to counter that organismal 
design can be understood, under very general conditions, in terms of inclusive fitness maximisation 
[36]. We suggest that the discrepancy between these statements is resolved by replacing 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* 
with 𝐼𝐹>)'?, which, we have argued, is a more general maximand. 
We advocate the idea that long-term phenotypic evolution tends to follow the genome’s ‘majority 
interest’. Our rationale is that, although only genes that actually affect a given trait matter for its 
evolution, the genes that matter can change over time [28,37]. Even if a trait is currently affected by 
only one or a few loci, in the long term the whole genome is a target for mutations whose effects 
can modify those of these few loci. This makes it relevant to ask what modifier genes would be 
selected for. Are they those that strengthen or those that undermine a given phenotypic effect? The 
phrase “the trait serves/opposes the genome’s majority interest” is shorthand for: the trait selects for 
unlinked modifiers improving/undermining it. Accordingly, the genome’s ‘majority interest’ 
(formally encapsulated in a reference gene’s interest) should manifest over evolutionary time 
because traits that align with it tend to be improved through complementary, cumulative 
contributions from unlinked genes, whereas traits opposed to it will tend to be eliminated.  
Fortunately, the invaluable ‘Taylor-Frank method’ [30] to construct kin selection models is fully 
compatible with our theory. This method finds evolutionarily stable values of a continuous trait 
such that no mutant gene can invade that slightly changes the resident trait value. This includes 
stability against small-effect, low-penetrance genes that meet our definition of a reference gene. 
Since only a population whose members already maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'? leaves no scope for the invasion 
of a reference gene (section 6), this implies – perhaps surprisingly – that the Taylor-Frank method 
finds strategies that (locally) maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'? rather than 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*. How could this important 
implication have been overlooked? We see two likely reasons. First, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* works as an 
accounting tool for genes with small (hence approximately additive) effects, which are the type of 
genes considered by the Taylor-Frank method. Some might therefore be tempted to conclude that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* will also work as a phenotypic maximand. This conclusion is unjustified, however, 
because (approximate) additivity at the gene level does not imply additivity at the organism level. 
And without additivity at the organism level, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* does not fully capture an organism’s causal 
effects on gene propagation (section 7). Second, ambiguity arises from the widespread use of verbal 
definitions that purport to describe 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, but, in fact, obfuscate 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* and 𝐼𝐹>)'?. For 
example, inclusive fitness has been called “the property of an individual organism which will 
appear to be maximized when what is really being maximized is gene survival” [38] or “the 
component of reproductive success an organism can influence” [39]. While the latter definition 
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maps to 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* when applied to models with additive interactions, it maps to 𝐼𝐹>)'? when 
applied to nature. In reality, no component of an organism’s reproduction is a priori beyond its 
influence, in the sense that it is unaffected by any evolvable aspect of the focal organism’s 
phenotype. For example, for an organism to convert help from others into offspring, it must allocate 
resources to its gonads. In nature, the “component of reproductive success an organism can 
influence” therefore includes all its offspring. Similarly, when applied to nature, Hamilton’s [1] 
“generalized unrigorous statement of the main principle” (which does not mention any ‘stripping’) 
can arguably be read as an implicit endorsement of 𝐼𝐹>)'?: “The social behaviour of a species 
evolves in such a way that in each distinct behaviour-evoking situation the individual will seem to 
value his neighbours’ fitness against his own according to the coefficients of relationship 
appropriate to that situation.” 
Our approach is inspired by the ‘gene’s eye view’ of adaptation made popular by Dawkins’ The 
Selfish Gene [4]. According to this view, adaptive phenotypes can be identified by metaphorically 
adopting a gene’s first-person perspective to ask: “what phenotype should I induce to make more 
copies of myself?” However, in the words of Hammerstein [28] “…a naive interpretation of the 
idea of the ’selfish gene’ can easily direct our attention to an inappropriate level of biological 
organization (genes instead of phenotypes). This is so because [in the multi-locus case] the genetic 
scene can only be described as an ‘incredible mess’ although very clear economic principles hold - 
in the long run - at the phenotypic level.” Our reference gene concept is an attempt to tidy up the 
‘gene’s eye view’, by envisaging a gene that embodies the guiding principle of multi-locus 
evolution. This approach reflects the view of many biologists that it is usually more interesting to 
ask “what phenotypes are adaptive?” than to ask “what hypothetical gene could be selected for?” 
For example, undue focus on the latter question might lead us to predict fathers who kill their 
daughters to feed their sons (if caused by a gene on the father’s Y- chromosome - a hypothetical 
variant of a Mendelian outlaw gene [20]); or to predict indiscriminate altruism between all members 
of a species (caused by a greenbeard gene gone to fixation). Such outcomes involving rogue genes 
are unlikely to be observed in nature because – being incompatible with the genome’s majority 
interest – they can neither evolve through cumulative contributions of unlinked genes, nor be stable 
in the long term. We are left with two equivalent metaphors for long-term phenotypic evolution. We 
can think either of reference genes strategically ‘trying’ to maximise their propagation, or of 
organisms evolving to maximise their vehicle quality (or 𝐼𝐹>)'?). Both metaphors capture the view 
that organisms are integrated systems shaped over generations by the contributions of numerous 
genes, and, as such, are unlikely to perpetually retain traits under counter-selection from the 
majority of the genome.  
To conclude, our present theory might confirm what many readers intuitively think – that organisms 
appear to be designed to maximise the weighted offspring count that defines 𝐼𝐹>)'?. The prevalence 
of this intuition is seen in the persistent tendency to define inclusive fitness as 𝐼𝐹>)'? in teaching 
materials and other non-mathematical texts [16,40–42]. This view has, however, never been 
explicitly justified, and it stands in contradiction to the prevailing orthodoxy among theoreticians. 
Our line of argument, if valid, would create the unusual situation that orthodoxy should change to 
match the textbooks, rather than the other way around.  
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Figure 1. Performance of inclusive fitness measures as an accounting tool for genes without or with 
mirror effect. Big circles represent adults; the shaded one is the focal actor. Small circles represent 
offspring produced without help from the social environment. Crossed-out small circles represent 
offspring not produced as a result of a costly helping act. Small squares represent offspring 
produced through helping. The shading of small squares represents such offsprings’ relatedness to 
the focal individual, relative to its own offspring. Black arrows represent helping acts performed by 
the focal individual, pointing to the resultant offspring produced by the non-focal individual. 
Dashed arrows represent helping acts received by the focal individual from its social environment. 
We compare 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* with 𝐼𝐹>)'?, which differs from 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* in that none of the focal 
individual’s offspring are stripped away. A) In a population where by default each individual 
produces two offspring without giving or receiving help (baseline = 2), a mutant gene without 
mirror effect causes the focal individual to help a relative, yielding an indirect fitness benefit rb, at 
cost –c. Because the focal individual’s behaviour is not mirrored by its relative, we have 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* = 𝐼𝐹>)'? = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐, and the gene is positively selected if 𝐼𝐹 > 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 (i.e. 
rb - c > 0). Thus, both 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* and 𝐼𝐹>)'? work as an accounting tool for this type of gene. B) 
Similar to A, but with mirror effect: here the mutant gene which causes the focal individual to help 
is also expressed in any relatives that carry its identical copies. As a result, the focal individual 
produces 𝑓𝑏 additional offspring, where 𝑓 = 𝑓[𝑟, 𝑝] is the probability of receiving help, which is a 
function of relatedness r, the gene’s frequency p, as well as the gene’s penetrance. (Moreover, 
looking beyond the simplistic case where all helping in the population is due to the focal allele, the f 
term should also account for help received due to behaviour encoded by other loci.) This situation 
yields 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 (not including the 𝑓𝑏 offspring produced due to the social 
environment) and 𝐼𝐹>)'? = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑓𝑏. Now 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* > 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 still correctly 
predicts selection on the focal gene (provided fitness effects are additive [26]), because it isolates 
the gene’s causal effects from the correlational component 𝑓𝑏 that would arise even if the gene in 
the focal organism were not expressed. By contrast, 𝐼𝐹>)'? > 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 does not correctly predict 
selection because the term 𝑓𝑏 includes a benefit (in the focal individual) whose cost (in another 
individual) is unaccounted for [16]. However, rather than being a shortcoming of 𝐼𝐹>)'?, this merely 
reflects the general difficulty of inferring a causal effect from correlational data. In a causal 
modelling framework [17,18], this difficulty is readily avoided by calculating 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[don’t	help] =𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑓𝑏 as the focal individual’s counterfactual value of 𝐼𝐹>)'? that would arise if the focal 
individual did not help. Then the focal gene’s causal effect on the focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? is positive 
if 𝐼𝐹>)'?[help] − 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[don’t	help] = 𝑟𝑏	– 	𝑐 > 	0 , which recovers the correct inclusive fitness 
effect. Thus, the focal gene is selected for if expressing it causes the focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? to 
increase. 
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Figure 2. Example of how the mirror effect, in combination with non-additive interactions between 
individuals, can generate selection for a trait that reduces vehicle quality. Consider a population 
where siblings interact (e.g., pedigree relatedness r = 0.5), and where unilateral help (A) is highly 
efficient (e.g., b = 10, c = 1) whereas mutual help (B) is completely inefficient due to strong 
interference between matching phenotypes (symbolised by lightning bolt; d = -10 in the notation of 
Supplementary Material 1). In this situation, helping cannot evolve based on a gene with full 
penetrance, because benefits accrue exclusively to individuals who lack the helping gene. Thus, 
when a full-penetrance helping gene (which is subject to the mirror effect) is introduced at low 
frequency into the population, its alternative allele (which can be considered a full-penetrance non-
helping gene) will quickly spread back to fixation. This occurs even though at the phenotypic level, 
individuals could increase their vehicle quality by switching to unilateral helping, thus reaping the 
indirect benefits shown in A. Even though defection to non-helping reduces vehicle quality, it 
spreads to fixation based on a mirror effect rogue gene - leading to an equilibrium where helping 
does not occur. In other words, organisms end up making no use of the huge indirect fitness benefit 
that would accrue from unilateral helping, which contradicts the idea that individuals are selected to 
maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Crucially, however, this equilibrium without helping is only stable under the 
restrictive assumption that mutations without mirror effect cannot arise (Supplementary Material 1). 
If such mutants arise (e.g. a low-penetrance gene; or a gene for helping your younger sibling, 
conditional on being the older one), they generate selection for helping due to the indirect benefits 
shown in A.   
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Figure 3. Creel’s paradox, modified after Queller [12]: in an obligate cooperative breeding system 
where reproduction requires exactly one breeder and one helper, the focal individual has a choice 
between becoming the breeder (A) or the helper (B), while the non-focal individual (based on some 
asymmetry) must take the remaining role. Since offspring produced due to the social environment 
are excluded from 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*, the focal individual has lower 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* in A than B (0 versus 2r), 
despite transmitting more genes as a breeder. Invoking 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* as a phenotypic maximand 
predicts wrongly that the focal individual should prefer to become the helper (Supplementary 
Material 3). By contrast, the focal individual’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? is higher in A than B (2 versus 2𝑟), predicting 
correctly that the focal individual should prefer to become the breeder. This matches Queller’s [12] 
prediction, which he obtained (without invoking inclusive fitness as a property of an organism) by 
applying Hamilton’s rule separately to two genes, each expressed conditionally in one of the two 
roles.   
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Supplementary Material 1: Mirror effect rogue genes 
We have defined mirror effect rogue (MER) genes as alleles which reduce the vehicle quality of the 
individuals expressing them, but spread because of the mirror effect. Here we use a model to 
examine under what circumstances MER genes can exist, and to what extent they may then pose an 
impediment to 𝐼𝐹>)'? being a phenotypic maximand. First, we characterise the conditions that select 
for behaviours encoded by genes with mirror effect. Next, we characterise the conditions that select 
for behaviours encoded by genes without mirror effect (e.g., a reference gene that is guaranteed to 
be positively selected if it increases vehicle quality, since vehicle quality is defined by a reference 
gene’s propagation success). Then, we compare the two sets of conditions to identify conditions 
where selection on genes with or without mirror effect favours opposite phenotypes. These are the 
conditions where MER genes can occur. Finally, we show that equilibria established by MER genes 
(at which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is not maximised) are not stable against invasion by mutant genes without mirror 
effect. In contrast, the corresponding equilibria at which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is maximised are stable against 
mutant genes both with and without mirror effect. 
Consider a haploid species (for simplicity) with the following life cycle: individuals interact for one 
round of a pairwise game, played between relatives of pedigree relatedness r. For example, 
everyone interacts once with a full sibling (𝑟 = 0.5), or everyone interacts once with a half-sibling 
(𝑟 = 0.25), or everyone interacts once with either a clone (with probability r) or with an unrelated 
individual. The essential point is that a rare gene, if present in a focal individual, occurs in its social 
partner with probability r due to coancestry. After this pairwise interaction, individuals disperse 
randomly, mate, and reproduce. The assumption of random dispersal rules out local competition 
(see Supplementary Material 5, Q34), such that all offspring have an equal chance to reproduce. 
This ensures that offspring number is an evolutionarily relevant measure of reproductive success. 
There are two behavioural options: cooperate (denoted “+”) or defect (denoted “−”). If a focal 
individual cooperates, it pays cost c to provide to its relative either benefit b (if the relative defects) 
or 𝑏 + 𝑑 (if the relative cooperates). If the focal individual defects, it pays no cost nor does it 
provide a benefit. If there is synergy (𝑑 > 0), mutual cooperation is more efficient than unilateral 
cooperation. If there is interference (𝑑 < 0), unilateral cooperation is more efficient than mutual 
cooperation. If fitness effects are additive (𝑑 = 0), mutual and unilateral cooperation are equally 
efficient. Although here we focus on the evolution of a cooperative trait (with 𝑏 > 0, 𝑐 > 0), an 
analogous argument holds for a selfish trait (with 𝑏 < 0, 𝑐 < 0). 
 
 
 
 
 
The focal individual’s resultant payoffs, as listed in the matrix above, are changes in direct 
reproductive success: i.e., own offspring produced (or not produced) as a result of the interaction, as 
compared to some baseline number.  
 
1. Genes with mirror effect 
Consider a gene which always causes its carriers to cooperate, whereas its allele always causes its 
carriers to defect. This type of gene is subject to a mirror effect of maximum strength: if two 
individuals that have the focal gene interact, both are certain to express the gene (hence to 
cooperate). In a population where relatives interact, this type of gene makes its carriers interact 
 non-focal actor + − 
focal 
actor 
+ 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 −𝑐 − 𝑏 0 
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disproportionally with their own type. Specifically, let relatedness r cause phenotypic correlation 𝑅 = 𝑟 between social partners, such that the probability of facing a given phenotype is conditional 
on one’s own phenotype as follows [43]: cooperators face a cooperator with probability 𝑓_ = 𝑅 +(1 − 𝑅)𝑝, while facing a defector with probability (1 − 𝑓_). Here, R is the probability that a non-
focal individual ‘mirrors’ a focal individual’s phenotype because their genes at the focal locus are 
identical by descent; and p, the frequency of cooperation in the population, corresponds to the 
probability that a focal cooperator faces a cooperator even when their genes at the focal locus are 
not identical by descent. Defectors face a cooperator with probability 𝑓 = (1 − 𝑅)𝑝, while facing a 
defector with probability = (1 − 𝑓 ). This leads to expected payoffs 𝑊_ = 𝑓_(𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) + (1 −𝑓_)(−𝑐) for cooperators and 𝑊 = 𝑓 (𝑏) for defectors. Since we are dealing with genes that are 
always expressed, personal payoffs of each phenotype are representative of the underlying genes’ 
transmission success. Hence we can use personal payoffs of each phenotype to infer the direction of 
selection. If 𝑊_ = 𝑊 , the focal gene for cooperation is selectively neutral. Solving for p, this 
occurs at equilibrium frequency  ?̂? = c`;(d_e)e(f`;)           (1). 
Likewise, the focal gene for cooperation is selected positively when 𝑊_ > 𝑊 , and negatively 
when 𝑊_ < 𝑊 . By substituting into these inequalities, we can characterise selection as follows. 
Given synergy (𝑑 > 0), cooperation is selected positively while 𝑝 > ?̂? and negatively while 𝑝 < ?̂?. 
This implies that, if ?̂? is an internal equilibrium (i.e., in the range 0 < ?̂? < 1), it is unstable due to 
positive frequency-dependent selection. Given interference (𝑑 < 0), cooperation is selected 
positively while 𝑝 < ?̂? and negatively while 𝑝 > ?̂?. This implies that, if ?̂? is an internal equilibrium, 
it is stable due to negative frequency-dependent selection. This is the equilibrium found in earlier 
studies [24,25] where 𝐼𝐹>)'? was not maximised. Following Hines & Maynard Smith [44], we call 
this the Grafen ESS. 
In a population at the Grafen ESS, consider a rare mutant gene (either an allele at the same locus, or 
a mutation at a second locus overriding the first) that makes its carriers cooperate with probability 
P, and defect otherwise. If we think of defection as the ‘null’ phenotype, we can interpret this 
mutant gene as a cooperation gene with penetrance P. When a mutant individual who carries this 
gene faces a cooperator (as happens with probability 𝑓%g( = 𝑟𝑃 + (1 − 𝑟)?̂? ), it obtains payoff 𝑃(𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑃)𝑏. When facing a defector (with probability (1 − 𝑓%g()), the mutant obtains 𝑃(−𝑐). Hence the mutant’s expected payoff is 𝑊%g( = 𝑓%g([𝑃(𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑃)𝑏] + (1 −𝑓%g()𝑃(−𝑐). The mutant gene can invade if mutant individuals enjoy higher neighbour-modulated 
fitness than the population mean, i.e. if 𝑊%g( > 𝑊_ = 𝑊 . For P in the range (0 < 𝑃 < 1), this 
reduces to 𝑑 < 0, which is always met when the Grafen ESS exists. Thus, any cooperation gene 
with incomplete penetrance can invade the Grafen ESS. 
 
2. Genes without mirror effect 
In a population where phenotypes are controlled by a one-locus two-allele system with full 
penetrance, such that interacting phenotypes tend to resemble each other (see above), consider 
selection at a second locus unlinked to the first. At this second (previously neutral) locus, a rare 
mutant gene variant arises that encodes defection without mirror effect, which transforms 
individuals that would otherwise have cooperated into defectors. There are two ways in which such 
a mutant gene may arise: (i): a neutral gene mutates into an allele for defection with low penetrance 
(thus meeting our definition of a reference gene); (ii): a neutral gene mutates into an allele for 
defection whose expression is conditional on some asymmetry between organisms.  
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Consider a focal individual that is turned into a defector due to expressing a rare mutant gene 
without mirror effect. When this focal individual faces a cooperator (as happens with probability 𝑓_, 
since the focal individual would have cooperated but for the focal gene’s effect), it obtains payoff b 
instead of 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐, amounting to net gain – 𝑑 + 𝑐. If the focal individual faces a defector (with 
probability 1 − 𝑓_), it obtains payoff 0 instead of −𝑐, amounting to net gain c. Thus, the focal 
gene’s causal effect on the focal individual’s change in direct fitness, as a result of defecting, is 𝛥i&jkl( = 𝑓_(−𝑑 + 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑓_)𝑐. Since a gene without mirror effect is not expressed by every 
individual that carries it, its transmission success cannot be inferred from the personal payoff of 
only the individuals that do express it. Instead, the payoffs of individuals that carry the focal gene 
but do not express it must also be accounted for. We do this by considering indirect effects, 
mediated by the relative’s payoff: if the relative is a cooperator, it obtains (due to the focal 
individual’s change in behaviour) −𝑐 instead of 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐, amounting to net change – 𝑏 − 𝑑. If the 
relative is a defector, it obtains 0 instead of 𝑏, amounting to net change – 𝑏. Thus, the focal gene’s 
causal effect on the focal individual’s change in indirect fitness, as a result of defecting, is 𝛥&*i&jkl( = 𝑟[𝑓_(−𝑏 − 𝑑) + (1 − 𝑓_)(−𝑏)]. The focal gene encoding defection is selectively 
neutral if it has zero net effect on the number of copies transmitted to the next generation. This net 
effect includes all causal effects of the focal gene being expressed (compared to the counterfactual 
of not being expressed) in the focal individual. Selective neutrality occurs when 𝛥i&jkl( +𝛥&*i&jkl( = 0; i.e., when expressing the focal gene does not change the focal individual’s vehicle 
quality. This occurs when 𝑝 equals 𝑝` = c`;(d_e_;e)e(f`;m)           (2). 
Likewise, when 𝛥i&jkl( + 𝛥&*i&jkl( > 0, the focal gene is selected positively because it causes more 
copies to be transmitted to the next generation (compared to the number transmitted in the absence 
of its phenotypic effect; i.e. compared to a neutral gene). And when 𝛥i&jkl( + 𝛥&*i&jkl( < 0, the 
focal gene is negatively selected for analogous reasons. By substituting into these inequalities, we 
can characterise selection as follows. Given synergy (𝑑 > 0), the focal gene is selected positively if 𝑝 < 𝑝` (i.e., the frequency of cooperators is sufficiently low) and negatively if 𝑝 > 𝑝`. Given 
interference (𝑑 < 0), the focal gene is selected positively if 𝑝 > 𝑝` (i.e., the frequency of 
cooperators is sufficiently high) and negatively if 𝑝 < 𝑝`.  
Conversely, now consider selection for a rare gene encoding cooperation without mirror effect, 
which transforms individuals that would otherwise have defected into cooperators. If a focal 
individual expressing this gene faces a cooperator (as happens with probability 𝑓  , since the focal 
individual would have defected but for the focal gene’s effect), it obtains payoff 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 instead 
of b, amounting to net gain 𝑑 − 𝑐. If the focal individual faces a defector (with probability 1 − 𝑓 ), 
it obtains payoff – 𝑐 instead of 0, amounting to net gain – 𝑐. Thus, the focal gene’s causal effect on 
the focal individual’s change in direct fitness, as a result of defecting, is 𝛥i&jkl( = 	 𝑓 (𝑑 − 𝑐) 	+	(1 − 𝑓 )	(−𝑐). Now consider indirect effects, mediated by the relative’s payoff: if the relative is a 
cooperator, it obtains (due to the focal individual’s change in behaviour) 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 instead of −𝑐, 
amounting to net gain 𝑏 + 𝑑. If the relative is a defector, it obtains 𝑏 instead of 0, amounting to net 
gain 𝑏. Thus, the focal gene’s causal effect on the focal individual’s change in indirect fitness, as a 
result of cooperating, is 𝛥&*i&jkl( = 𝑟[𝑓 (𝑏 + 𝑑) + (1 − 𝑓 )(𝑏)]. The focal gene encoding 
cooperation is selectively neutral if has zero net effect on its number of copies transmitted to the 
next generation. This net effect includes all causal effects of the focal gene being expressed 
(compared to the counterfactual of not being expressed) in the focal individual. Selective neutrality 
occurs when 𝛥i&jkl( + 𝛥&*i&jkl( = 0. This occurs when 𝑝 equals 𝑝_ = c`;de(f`;m)           (3) 
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Using the same logic as above, we can characterise selection as follows. Given synergy (𝑑 > 0), the 
focal gene is selected positively if 𝑝 > 𝑝_ (i.e., the frequency of cooperators is sufficiently high) 
and negatively if 𝑝 < 𝑝_. Given interference (𝑑 < 0), the focal gene is selected positively if 𝑝 <𝑝_ (i.e., the frequency of cooperators is sufficiently low) and negatively if 𝑝 > 𝑝_. An alternative 
method to obtain eqns. (2) and (3) is to calculate selection for a modifier gene with general 
penetrance level P, and then take the limit of low penetrance (𝑃 → 0).  
 
3. Mirror effect rogue genes 
By our definition, a MER gene spreads via the mirror effect despite (on average) reducing the 
vehicle quality of the individuals expressing it. This occurs when a trait is positively selected as 
described in ‘Genes with mirror effect’ above, while the opposite trait is positively selected as 
described in ‘Genes without mirror effect’ (e.g. based on a reference gene). The conditions for this 
to occur simultaneously can only be met when there is interference, 𝑑 < 0 (Table S1). Specifically, 
a MER gene for defection can spread at some 𝑝 > ?̂? whenever pure cooperation is not an ESS (e.g. 
Figure 2). Likewise, a MER gene for cooperation can spread at some 𝑝 < ?̂? whenever pure 
defection is not an ESS. Intuitively, these findings can be explained as follows. Interference reduces 
the efficiency of cooperating with other cooperators. This creates conditions where switching to 
cooperation is worthwhile only if it can be done unilaterally, but not if it involves a correlated 
switch (due to the mirror effect) by the social partner (Figure 2). Likewise, there are conditions 
where switching to defection is worthwhile only if it can be done unilaterally, but not if the switch 
is mirrored by relatives.  
It is, perhaps, not obvious why MER genes do not occur under synergy (𝑑 > 0), even though the 
mirror effect broadens the conditions under which a gene for cooperation can invade (from 𝑟𝑏 −𝑐 > 0 without mirror effect, to 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑑 > 0 with mirror effect [25]). In the range where only 
the latter condition holds, the mirror effect evidently reverses the direction of selection, but it does 
so without reducing cooperators’ vehicle quality. Intuitively this can be explained as follows: the 
mirror effect elevates the (local) frequency of cooperators around any focal cooperator, up to the 
point where cooperation becomes optimal given positive frequency-dependent selection. 
 
4. Reciprocal invasion of genes with or without mirror effect 
What phenotypes will evolve in the long run, if predicted equilibria differ based on genes with or 
without mirror effect? This depends, in part, on whether each equilibrium can be invaded by genes 
of the other type. In what follows we assume 𝑑 < 0, as required for stable mixed equilibria to exist. 
Because a gene for cooperation without mirror effect is selected for if 𝑝 < 𝑝_ (see above), the 
Grafen ESS at ?̂? (with mirror effect) can be invaded by a gene for cooperation without mirror effect 
if ?̂? < 𝑝_. This yields 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) < 0, which is the condition for pure cooperation not 
being an ESS [25]. Thus, whenever pure cooperation is not an ESS, the Grafen ESS can be invaded 
by a gene for cooperation without mirror effect. Similarly, the Grafen ESS can be invaded by a gene 
for defection without mirror effect if ?̂? > 𝑝`. This yields 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, which is always true when ?̂? > 0 in the first place. Thus, the Grafen ESS can always be invaded by a gene for defection 
without mirror effect. 
Under the same parameter settings, two kinds of equilibrium – symmetric and asymmetric – can 
exist at which vehicle quality is maximised, such that mutant genes without mirror effect cannot 
invade. Here we do not model explicitly how these equilibria might be reached (but see 
Supplementary Material 2). Instead, we merely note that eventually one of them should be reached 
if phenotypic evolution follows the genome’s ‘majority interest’ towards phenotypically adaptive 
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outcomes. Consistent with the ‘streetcar theory of evolution’ [28], we show in Supplementary 
Material 2 that, barring genetic constraints, phenotypically adaptive outcomes can become realised 
through a variety of genetic mechanisms.  
 
4.1 Symmetric ESS 
If there exists no asymmetry (or negotiation) between interacting individuals that would allow for 
conditional gene expression, then the mirror effect can nevertheless be avoided by genes having low 
penetrance. Successive invasions of such genes will tend to reduce the phenotypic correlation 
towards 𝑅 = 0, so that 𝑓_ = 𝑓 = 𝑝 (i.e., the probability of facing a cooperator is independent of 
the focal individual’s phenotype, and equals the frequency of cooperators in the population). Re-
calculating either 𝑝_ or 𝑝` given 𝑅 = 0 yields the mixed ESS  𝑝∗ = c`;de(f_;)             (4) 
as the value of p at which further mutants without mirror effect cannot obtain a selective advantage 
by switching phenotypes one way or the other. We call this equilibrium the standard ESS, to 
distinguish it from the Grafen ESS. The standard ESS may be approached in phenotypic space by 
the combined action of genes with and without mirror effect, where genes with successively weaker 
mirror effect do the ‘fine-tuning’ near the equilibrium (Supplementary Material 2). Alternatively, in 
what Grafen [24] called the ‘continuous strategy case’, the standard ESS can also be reached if 
evolution proceeds exclusively by small-effect genes affecting the propensity to cooperate. In a 
population at the standard ESS, the average payoff is 𝑊p = 𝑝∗𝑊_ + (1 − 𝑝∗)𝑊 , where 𝑊_ =𝑝∗(𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) + (1 − 𝑝∗)(−𝑐) and 𝑊 = 𝑝∗(𝑏) are the payoffs of cooperators and defectors, 
respectively. In this population, a mutant individual carrying a full-penetrance gene for cooperation 
(i.e. with mirror effect) obtains payoff 𝑊q_ = 𝑓r_(𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐) + s1 − 𝑓r_t(−𝑐), where 𝑓r_ = 𝑟 +(1 − 𝑟)𝑝∗. The resident population is stable against this mutant if 𝑊p > 𝑊q_, which leads to  𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) < 0          (5). 
This is the condition for pure cooperation not being an ESS, which is always satisfied when the 
standard ESS exists. Similarly, a mutant individual carrying a full-penetrance gene for defection 
obtains payoff 𝑊q` = 𝑓r` (𝑏), where 𝑓r` = (1 − 𝑟)𝑝∗. The resident population is stable against this 
mutant if 𝑊p > 𝑊q`, which leads to  𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0              (6). 
This is the condition for pure defection not being an ESS, which is always satisfied when the 
standard ESS exists [25]. 
 
4.2 Asymmetric ESS 
Alternatively, the mirror effect can be avoided by genes being expressed conditional on some 
(perhaps arbitrary) asymmetry between individuals. In the present model, an asymmetric ESS exists 
at which individuals cooperate in role A and defect in role B, such that 𝑓_ = 0 and 𝑓 = 1. For this 
outcome to be stable, two conditions need to be met. Firstly, it must be optimal to play “+” in role 
A given the individual in role B plays “–”. This is the case when playing “+” instead of “–” in role 
A yields higher vehicle quality; i.e., ∆i&jkl( +	∆&*i&jkl(> 0, where ∆i&jkl(= −𝑐 and ∆&*i&jkl(= 𝑟𝑏. 
This recovers condition (6). Secondly, it must be optimal to play “–” in role B given the individual 
in role A plays “+”. This is the case when playing “–” instead of “+” in role B yields higher vehicle 
quality; i.e., ∆i&jkl( +	∆&*i&jkl(> 0, where ∆i&jkl(= −𝑑 + 𝑐 and ∆&*i&jkl(= 𝑟(−𝑏 − 𝑑). This 
recovers condition (5). The average payoff in a population using this asymmetric ESS is 𝑊p =
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𝑝𝑊_ + (1 − 𝑝)𝑊 , where 𝑝 = 0.5 (as implied by interactions occurring in pairs), and 𝑊_ = −𝑐; 𝑊 = 𝑏 are the payoffs of cooperators and defectors, respectively. Now consider a mutant full-
penetrance gene for cooperation (i.e. with mirror effect), whose carriers experience roles A or B 
with equal probability. When in role A, such a mutant behaves like an individual of the resident 
population (a ‘resident’), but, unlike a resident, receives help with probability r. Its payoff in role A 
is thus 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 with probability r, and −𝑐 otherwise. When in role B, the mutant always faces a 
cooperator, yielding payoff 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐. The mutant’s expected payoff is thus 𝑊q_ = ;(d_e`c)_(f`;)(`c)_d_e`cv . 
The resident population is stable against this mutant if 𝑊p > 𝑊q_. This recovers condition (6), which 
is one of the conditions for the asymmetric ESS to exist in the first place. Thus, the population is 
stable against cooperator mutations with mirror effect whenever it is stable against cooperator 
mutations without mirror effect. 
Similarly, consider a mutant full-penetrance gene for defection. When in role A, a mutant individual 
carrying this gene always faces a defector, yielding the payoff from mutual defection, 0. When in 
role B, it faces a defector with probability r (yielding payoff 0) and a cooperator with probability (1 − 𝑟) (yielding payoff b). The mutant’s expected payoff is thus  𝑊q` = (f`;)(d)v .  
The resident population is stable against this mutant if 𝑊p > 𝑊q`. This recovers condition (5), which 
is one of the conditions for the asymmetric ESS to exist in the first place. Thus, the population is 
stable against defector mutations with mirror effect whenever it is stable against defector mutations 
without mirror effect. 
 
5. Conclusion 
If social interactions are subject to interference between matching phenotypes (e.g., mutual help is 
less efficient than unilateral help; 𝑑 < 0), MER genes may establish an evolutionary equilibrium at 
which individuals do not maximise vehicle quality. Crucially, however, this equilibrium can be 
invaded by genes without mirror effect (and indeed by genes with imperfect penetrance of any 
degree). In contrast, the reciprocal invasion by mutant genes with mirror effect, of the 
corresponding equilibria where vehicle quality is maximised, is not possible. Thus, only equilibria 
where vehicle quality (𝐼𝐹>)'?) is maximised can exhibit phenotypic long-term stability [28] with 
respect to mutations with any level of penetrance.  
 
Table S1: Conditions for the occurrence of MER genes 
MER gene for d condition comment 
cooperation > 0 𝑝` > 𝑝 > ?̂? not satisfiable1 < 0 𝑝` < 𝑝 < ?̂? satisfiable if 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, i.e. whenever pure 
defection is not an ESS [25] 
defection > 0 𝑝_ < 𝑝 < ?̂? not satisfiable2 < 0 𝑝_ > 𝑝 > ?̂? satisfiable if 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) < 0, i.e. 
whenever pure cooperation is not an ESS [25] 
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p is the frequency of cooperators in the population; ?̂? is the frequency of cooperators at the Grafen ESS of 
eq. (1); 𝑝` (and 𝑝_) are threshold values of p at which a rare gene without mirror effect for turning 
cooperators into defectors (or defectors into cooperators) is selectively neutral.  
1 A contradiction arises because 𝑝` > 𝑝w implies 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, while 𝑝` > 0 implies 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑑(1 + 𝑟) < 0. 
These cannot both be true if 𝑑 > 0.  
2 A contradiction arises because 𝑝_ < 𝑝w implies 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 + 𝑑(1 + 𝑟) < 0, while 𝑝_ < 1 implies 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 +𝑑(1 + 𝑟v) > 0. Since 𝑟 ≤ 1, these cannot both be true while 𝑑 > 0. Note that 𝑝_ < 1 is a necessary 
condition for 𝑝_ < 𝑝 to hold, as p cannot exceed 1.   
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Supplementary Material 2: Individual-based simulations 
To illustrate the co-evolutionary interplay of genes with different levels of penetrance, we study the 
‘symmetric case’ of Supplementary Material 1 with individual-based simulations. The simulation 
proceeds in tmax discrete time steps. 
Genes and phenotypes. We assume haploid genetics. Each individual has one main locus and 2*m 
modifier loci. The main locus has allelic values “0” for “defect” and “1” for “cooperate”. Modifier 
loci have allelic values of “0” for “inactive” and “1” for “active”. Half of the 2*m modifier loci are 
dedicated to modifying each of the two possible allelic values (0 or 1) of the main locus. In addition 
to specifying a phenotype (i.e., a ‘default’ phenotype to be expressed in the absence of modifiers), 
each allele at the main locus also has a property M (called modifiability) that specifies its 
susceptibility to having its default phenotype changed by modifier genes. We consider scenarios 
where M is either held fixed or free to evolve.  
(a) Fixed modifiability. M is constrained to always take the same value. In different simulations, 
this value can be either 0 (“no modification possible”; in effect, this simulates a one-locus system) 
or 1 (“maximum modifiability”). 
(b) Evolving modifiability. For each allele copy at the main locus, M is initialised by sampling 
values from a continuous uniform distribution between 0 and 2. (The same distribution is also used 
to sample mutations – see below.) Although values M > 1 are functionally equivalent to M = 1 (see 
below), defining the range of M in this way is useful for detecting selection for reduced M, as 
compared to the expected mean of M = 1 in the absence of selection.  
If an individual’s main allele has value “0” and modifiability M, the individual cooperates with 
probability min[𝑀, 1] ∙ ∑ 𝑣/𝑚, where ∑𝑣/𝑚 is the mean of the allelic values v of the relevant 
modifier genes. Similarly, if an individual’s main allele has value “1” and modifiability M, the 
individual cooperates with probability 1 −min[𝑀, 1] ∙ ∑ 𝑣 /𝑚. Whether the phenotype is to 
cooperate or defect is then randomly assigned based on these probabilities.  
This formulation implies that a single active modifier gene on its own has probability M/m of 
reversing the default phenotype specified by the main locus. Hence increasing m is equivalent to 
decreasing the penetrance of each modifier gene.  
Mating and social interactions. In each step, the total population of size N is randomly arranged 
into N/2 mating pairs. Each pair sexually produces 4 offspring, that inherit alleles by unlinked 
Mendelian inheritance. Each set of offspring is arranged in 2 sibling-pairs, to play one round of the 
non-additive game of Supplementary Material 1. Payoffs, which define each individual’s direct 
reproduction (i.e., neighbour-modulated fitness), are assigned based on interacting phenotypes. 
Mutation. Mutations occur independently at each locus (of each offspring) with probability 𝜇. 
When a gene mutates, its allelic value switches from 0 to 1 or vice versa. In the continuous strategy 
case of Figure S1, new allelic values are sampled from a continuous uniform distribution between 0 
and 1. In case (b), when M is allowed to evolve freely, for each mutation at the main locus a new M 
value is randomly sampled from a uniform distribution between 0 and 2. This formulation allows 
that high-penetrance mutations at the main locus, which override any modifiers, may arise at any 
time.  
Recruitment. The next generation is obtained by randomly sampling N offspring, using payoffs as 
sampling probabilities. To ensure that expected contributions to the future population (i.e. 
reproductive values) are proportional to relative payoffs, we sample with replacement. Rather than 
implying that the same individual can survive twice, this should be interpreted as shorthand for 
letting each individual reproduce many offspring in proportion to its payoff, and then randomly pick 
N survivors from the resultant total pool. 
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Default settings. tmax=1000; N=1000; 𝜇 = 0.001. Game payoff parameters: b = 5; d = -2.5; c = 1. 
Relatedness is held fixed at r = 0.5, as implied by interactions occurring between siblings. With 
these parameter settings, the Grafen ESS (Supplementary Material 1, eq. 1), at which expected 𝐼𝐹>)'? is not maximised, occurs at cooperation frequency ?̂? = 0.2. The corresponding standard ESS 
(Supplementary Material 1, eq. 4), at which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is maximised, occurs at cooperation frequency 𝑝∗ = 0.4. The population starts at cooperation frequency p = 0.5. 
Results. Figures show mean values of 100 replicate runs. Running the simulation as a one-locus 
two-allele system with full penetrance (i.e., M = 0) leads to the Grafen ESS of eq. (1) (Fig. S1). 
Introducing mutations with incomplete penetrance quickly changes the outcome to the standard 
ESS of eq. (4) (Fig. S1, after time = 400). When running the simulation as a multi-locus system 
(i.e., 𝑀 ≥ 0), increasing the number (hence decreasing the penetrance) of modifiers shifts the 
equilibrium frequency of cooperation successively closer to the standard ESS, which is reached 
around m = 5 when M does not evolve [case (a)] (Figs. S2 A&B). In case (b), however, where the 
modifiability (M) at the main locus evolves, even a single modifier locus (m = 1) for each of the two 
possible allelic values (0 or 1) of the main locus suffices to establish the standard ESS (Fig. S3). In 
this case M evolves to lower values, which have the effect of limiting a modifier gene’s penetrance. 
This is advantageous because it reduces the disadvantageous tendency of facing one’s own 
phenotype (given interference, d < 0) for individuals that carry a modifier gene. By contrast, when 
M evolves and there are m = 10 low-penetrance modifier genes, M is selected to ensure full 
modifiability. This is because modifier genes automatically have low penetrance in this case, so 
being susceptible to them reduces the disadvantageous tendency of facing one’s own phenotype. 
Consistent with the results of Supplementary Material 1, these results indicate that the Grafen ESS 
tends to be replaced by the standard ESS when the restrictive genetic assumptions of the ‘discrete 
strategy case’ are relaxed.  
 
Figure S1. Discrete and continuous strategy case in a one-locus system. The main locus cannot be 
modified (i.e., M = 0), so other loci have no effect. Until time = 400, only allelic values 0 or 1 are 
allowed at the main locus. This corresponds to Grafen’s [45] ‘discrete strategy case’ for which the 
predicted equilibrium is the Grafen ESS. After time = 400, new mutations are drawn from a 
uniform distribution between 0 and 1, with allelic values interpreted as probabilities to cooperate. 
This resembles Grafen’s ‘continuous strategy case’ (for which the predicted equilibrium is the 
standard ESS), except that it makes no assumption of small mutational steps or weak selection. The 
right panel shows the phenotypic correlation between interacting siblings. Dashed line: Grafen ESS. 
Stippled line: standard ESS. 
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Figure S2 A & B. Main locus with fixed modifiability (i.e., M = 1) and m modifier loci per 
phenotype. The results are split into two graphs for clarity. Dashed line: Grafen ESS. Stippled line: 
standard ESS. 
 
 
Figure S3. Main locus with evolvable modifiability (i.e. M can vary between 0 and 2) and 𝑚 = 1 
modifier locus per phenotype. Dashed line: Grafen ESS. Stippled line: standard ESS. 
 
 
Figure S4. Main locus with evolvable modifiability (i.e. M can vary between 0 and 2) and 𝑚 = 10 
modifier loci per phenotype. Dashed line: Grafen ESS. Stippled line: standard ESS.  
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Supplementary Material 3: Maximisation of 𝑰𝑭𝐟𝐨𝐥𝐤 vs. 𝑰𝑭𝐇𝐚𝐦𝐢𝐥𝐭𝐨𝐧 
Since 𝐼𝐹>)'? is by definition proportional to the number of reference gene copies produced due to 
the focal individual’s phenotype, it follows that, unless the resident phenotype already maximises 𝐼𝐹>)'?, a rare mutant gene that makes it so (without mirror effect) will spread. This makes 
maximisation of 𝐼𝐹>)'? necessary for evolutionary stability. To examine if the same is true for 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* (i.e. if, despite their quantitative difference, both are always maximized by the same 
strategy), we use a simplified version of the model described in Supplementary Material 1. In this 
simplified version, we consider the special case where the focal individual is certain to face a 
cooperator – either because cooperation is fixed (𝑝 = 1), or (in the asymmetric case) because the 
focal individual adopts role B in a population where the resident strategy is to always cooperate in 
role A. We then examine whether the behaviour that maximises the focal individual’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? 
necessarily matches the behaviour that maximises its 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*. To that end, we consider that the 
focal individual’s behaviour may change independently of the non-focal individual’s behaviour – 
e.g. due to expressing a low-penetrance gene, or due to an experimental intervention. In its given 
social environment of facing a cooperator, the focal individual obtains  𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑏 + 𝑑 − 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑑)  
from cooperating, and  𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑏  
from defecting. Implicit in this formulation is the assumption that the focal individual has no causal 
effect on whether the non-focal individual incurs the cost of cooperation. (Without this assumption, 
another indirect component, −𝑟𝑐, would need to be included both in 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] and in 𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect].	This would not affect our conclusion.) Since 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* differs from 𝐼𝐹>)'? in 
excluding “all components which can be considered as due to the individual’s social environment”, 
the components to be excluded here are (𝑏 + 𝑑) if the focal individual cooperates, or b if the focal 
individual defects. This yields 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[cooperate] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑑)  
from cooperating and  𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[defect] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  
from defecting. The exclusion of b from both 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[cooperate] and 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[defect] is 
unproblematic in the sense that it does not affect the ranking of the focal individual’s options. By 
contrast, since d occurs in 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] but not in 𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect], excluding it to obtain the 
corresponding 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* may affect the ranking of options either in favour of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[cooperate] (if 𝑑 < 0) or in favour of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[defect] (if 𝑑 > 0). Only when fitness 
effects are additive (𝑑 = 0; as originally assumed by Hamilton [6]) can we rely on 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* 
necessarily predicting the same behaviour as 𝐼𝐹>)'?. 
However, even when 𝑑 ≠ 0, the situation can still be described by a modified version of Hamilton’s 
rule. For example, consider an experimental study in which an individual facing a cooperator is 
manipulated to cooperate instead of defect. The causal effects of this manipulation are a net loss to 
the focal individual’s reproduction of magnitude 𝐶 = −𝑐 + 𝑑, and a net gain to the recipient’s 
reproduction of magnitude 𝐵 = 𝑏 + 𝑑. The individual should therefore cooperate if 𝑟𝐵 − 𝐶 > 0, 
where B and C are net rather than additive effects. One could call this ‘Hamilton’s phenotypic rule’ 
as, instead of being concerned with selection for a focal gene, it provides a phenotypic criterion that 
must be met for a behaviour to increase a focal individual’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?. 
As another example, consider Creel’s paradox as described in Figure 3. Here, the focal individual 
obtains  
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𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑏  
from cooperating (i.e., becoming the helper), or  𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑏  
from defecting (i.e., becoming the breeder), where 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 = 0, 𝑐 = 0, 𝑏 = 2 (see Fig 3). 
The focal individual should prefer to become the helper if 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] > 𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect], 
yielding  𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 𝑏, 
which (with settings 𝑐 = 0, 𝑏 = 2 as indicated above) predicts correctly that the focal individual 
should never prefer to be the helper. 
Because component b in 𝐼𝐹>)'?[defect] reflects help received from the social environment, it should 
be excluded from 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* to obtain 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[cooperate] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑟𝑏  
from cooperating and  𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[defect] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  
from defecting. Accordingly, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[cooperate] > 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*[defect] yields 𝑟𝑏 − 𝑐 > 0, which 
(with settings 𝑐 = 0, 𝑏 = 2 as indicated above) predicts wrongly that the focal individual should 
prefer to be the helper whenever 𝑟 > 0.  
As before, the situation can still be described by Hamilton’s phenotypic rule (see above). Envisage 
an experimental study in which a focal breeder is manipulated to become a helper instead (so the 
former helper becomes the breeder). The causal effects of this manipulation are a net loss to the 
focal individual’s reproduction of magnitude 𝐶 = 𝑏 + 𝑐 (i.e. the b it no longer receives, plus the c it 
now pays), and a net gain to the non-focal individual’s reproduction of magnitude 𝐵 = 𝑏 + 𝑐 (i.e. 
the b it now receives, plus the c it no longer pays). Accordingly, the focal individual should 
cooperate (i.e., become the helper) if 𝑟𝐵 − 𝐶 > 0, where B and C are the net causal effects of its 
behaviour. This yields 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑐) > 𝑏 + 𝑐, which is not satisfied in the present example - predicting 
correctly that the focal individual should prefer to remain as the breeder. 
Conclusion 
When fitness effects are non-additive, 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* is not in general maximised by the same strategy 
as 𝐼𝐹>)'? – implying that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* does not generally work as a phenotypic maximand. However, 
if organisms maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'?, their behaviour follows a form of Hamilton’s rule in which cost and 
benefit are net effects rather than additive effects. This form of Hamilton’s rule corresponds to what 
Hamilton [1] called the “generalized unrigorous statement of the main principle”: “The social 
behaviour of a species evolves in such a way that in each distinct behaviour-evoking situation the 
individual will seem to value his neighbours’ fitness against his own according to the coefficients of 
relationship appropriate to that situation.”  
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Supplementary Material 4: Maximisation of 𝑰𝑭𝐟𝐨𝐥𝐤 vs. neighbour-modulated fitness 
Neighbour-modulated fitness [6] (NF) simply counts all of an individual’s own offspring, regardless 
of whether any of them are produced due to the social environment. Because a gene associated with 
high reproductive success will tend to spread (regardless of the causality of the association), the 
(average) NF of a gene’s carriers predicts whether a gene will spread. This is the basis of the so-
called ‘general form of Hamilton’s rule’ [32–34], which establishes that NF works as an accounting 
tool for any gene.  
Here we ask whether NF qualifies as a phenotypic maximand. Consider the model described in 
Supplementary Material 1, with 𝑑 = 0 for simplicity. In this model, a focal individual that 
cooperates obtains 𝐼𝐹>)'? = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑓𝑏 + 𝑟𝑏  
where 𝑓 is its probability of facing another cooperator (hence receiving a benefit b). The 
corresponding neighbour-modulated fitness is: 𝑁𝐹 = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑓𝑏. 
Note that NF excludes the indirect component rb which the focal individual obtains from causing its 
relative to produce b additional offspring. This leaves the cost of helping, −𝑐, as the only causal 
effect of the focal individual’s behaviour that is accounted for in NF. Thus, if we envisage an 
experimental intervention that prevents a costly helping act (with any 𝑏 > 0 and 𝑐 > 0), the focal 
individual’s NF would increase as a result. This shows that costly helping is inconsistent with 
organisms being adapted to maximise their NF. In other words, NF is not a phenotypic maximand 
(also see [3]).  
Nevertheless, NF is highly useful in theoretical models to derive the evolutionarily stable strategy 
(ESS) of one continuous trait at a time. This is done with the differentiation method of Taylor and 
Frank [30], which essentially answers the question: “If an organism could choose its genotypic 
value for a continuous trait X, on the assumption that changing its value by 1 unit will be 
accompanied by a correlated change of r units in its relatives, which value should it choose to 
maximise its neighbour-modulated fitness?” This question is useful to find the ESS because a rare 
gene affecting X will be positively selected if it increases the average NF of its carriers. The 
question does not, however, invoke NF as a phenotypic maximand. Whereas a phenotypic 
maximand should reflect a focal organism’s causal effects in its given social environment, the NF 
question invokes a change in the social environment that is merely correlated with, but not caused 
by, a property of the focal organism.  
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Supplementary Material 5: Questions and answers 
 
Q1 Do you claim that reference genes are a major driving force of phenotypic evolution? 
Q2 Why should a reference gene be ‘rarely or never expressed’? 
Q3 Does invoking low-penetrance ‘reference genes’ amount to assuming weak selection, genes of 
small effect size, and hence (approximately) additive interactions among genes?  
Q4 By invoking the abstraction and idealization of a reference gene, you reach conclusions about 
evolutionary dynamics that are merely heuristic. Why not stick with the precision of standard 
population genetic models? 
Q5 Why should it matter what outcomes are under an organism’s ‘control’? In other words, why 
should we view causality ‘through the lens’ of a focal organism’s effects? 
Q6 Why should we think of selection in terms of causal effects, rather than genotype-fitness (or 
trait-fitness) covariance? 
Q7 Does the mirror effect become unavoidable when a phenotype becomes common, such that 
organisms increasingly face their own phenotype in their social partners? 
Q8 Is it plausible that genes without mirror effect exist that affect any given trait? 
Q9 Does a gene with mirror effect necessarily generate a positive phenotypic correlation between 
interacting relatives? 
Q10 Are evolutionary ‘end points’ always determined by genes without mirror effect, rather than 
genes with mirror effect?  
Q11 Can there be an ‘evolutionary arms race’ between MER genes and genes without mirror 
effect? 
Q12 When the “Grafen ESS” is invaded by low-penetrance mutations, could the evolutionary trend 
towards the standard ESS be halted or reversed if high-penetrance mutations arise at a 
sufficiently higher rate than low-penetrance mutations? 
Q13 If the interplay between high- versus low- penetrance genes (unlike between meiotic drive 
versus Mendelian genes) is really a matter of genetic constraints rather than of conflict, 
doesn’t that make the parliament of genes a misleading metaphor? 
Q14 Do you have mathematical proof that 𝐼𝐹>)'? is a phenotypic maximand? 
Q15 Does calculating a focal gene’s causal effect on 𝐼𝐹>)'? (compared to the counterfactual 𝐼𝐹K>)'?) 
establish the direction of selection on that gene? 
Q16 Should evolution proceed towards phenotypes with higher 𝐼𝐹>)'? in a frequency-independent 
manner? 
Q17 When counting reference gene copies that come into existence because the focal individual 
exists, one implicitly invokes the counterfactual possibility that it does not exist. How should 
this apparently rather far-fetched possibility be interpreted? 
Q18 Why think of 𝐼𝐹>)'? as an absolute property of an organism, rather than consider only 
differences in 𝐼𝐹>)'? between phenotypes? After all, natural selection works on differences. 
Q19 Do you predict real organisms to be perfectly adapted to maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'??  
Q20 You define 𝐼𝐹>)'? so that a reference gene that increases an organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? is positively 
selected by definition. Then you predict that organisms should evolve towards maximising 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Isn’t that a circular argument? 
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Q21 According to West & Gardner [3], a phenotypic maximand must be under the organism’s ‘full 
control’, because organisms can only appear designed to maximise something they can 
control. Doesn’t that exclude 𝐼𝐹>)'? , which is in part controlled by others? 
Q22 Another way to describe the ‘double accounting problem’ that allegedly plagues 𝐼𝐹>)'? is that 
“it allows children to be counted many times, as though they had many existences” [20]. Is 
that a valid concern?  
Q23 With hindsight it seems quite intuitive that organisms should maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Has no-one 
explicitly argued for this before? 
Q24 If most biologists have intuitively thought about inclusive fitness correctly, does it really matter 
if we now call it the ‘folk definition of inclusive fitness’? 
Q25 How should empiricists measure 𝐼𝐹>)'??   
Q26 Is 𝐼𝐹>)'? the unique quantity that qualifies as a phenotypic maximand? 
Q27 How should we interpret Okasha & Martens’ [25] result that a quantity they call “Grafen 
1979 payoff” qualifies as a phenotypic maximand under broader conditions than 𝐼𝐹? 
Q28 Natural selection can be said to maximise a gene’s inclusive fitness effect (IFE) in the sense 
that, at each locus, the allele in a set of possibilities that has the highest IFE should end up 
being present at equilibrium. Is that the same as 𝐼𝐹>)'? being maximised? 
Q29 In the formal part of his paper, Hamilton [6] defines IF simply as 1 + IFE, where IFE is the 
focal gene’s inclusive fitness effect. This formulation implies that IF is maximised whenever 
IFE is maximised. Doesn’t that contradict the view that there is a deep conceptual distinction 
between IF (as a property of an organism) and IFE (as a property of a gene or trait)?  
Q30 Is calculating a focal helping gene’s causal effect on 𝐼𝐹>)'? (compared to the counterfactual 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect]) equivalent to Hamilton’s ‘stripping procedure’? 
Q31 The claim that the prescribed ‘stripping’ of fitness components is problematic for the use of 
inclusive fitness seems at odds with a lack of theoretical studies that actually involve any 
‘stripping’. Why?  
Q32 More often than not, causal effects in biology are probabilistic not deterministic. How do you 
account for that? 
Q33 In the statement that “organisms should maximize their expected 𝐼𝐹>)'?”, over what range of 
possibilities is the expectation to be taken? Over a given individual’s future possibilities, or 
over all possibilities that a randomly chosen individual at conception may face in its life? 
Q34 How do you account for so-called ‘cancellation effects’ [26,46,47] due to local competition? 
Q35 Are you suggesting we should change our methods of modelling social evolution? 
Q36 What advantage does an ‘organismal’ view of evolution have over a purely ‘gene-centred’ 
view that focusses only on what kinds of genes can be selected for? 
Q37 Isn’t it wrong to assume (as criticised by Dawkins [20]) “that an individual organism, as a 
coherent entity, works on behalf of copies of all the genes inside it”? 
Q38 Is the individual organism the unique level in the hierarchy of life at which natural selection 
can be said to optimise performance (i.e., vehicle quality, inclusive fitness)? 
Q39 Does the kinship theory of genomic imprinting, which posits that evolutionary interests may 
differ between paternally versus maternally-derived genes, contradict the idea that an 
individual’s genome has a ‘majority interest’? 
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Q40 Do you have anything to add for readers who are still sceptical? 
 
Reference genes and the parliament of genes 
 
Q1 Do you claim that reference genes are a major driving force of phenotypic evolution? 
No. We merely claim that phenotypic evolution is largely driven by genes whose phenotypic effects 
are qualitatively in line with the genome’s ‘majority interest’. A reference gene is a hypothetical 
gene whose idealized properties align its evolutionary ‘interest’ (i.e., the ranking of possible 
phenotypic options with respect to how well they propagate the gene) with the genome’s ‘majority 
interest’ as to what phenotype should be expressed. It is a conceptual tool to delineate what 
phenotypic changes caused by actual genes will increase vehicle quality, implying a high potential 
to make a lasting contribution to phenotypic design. By contrast, actual genes that match our 
definition of a reference gene are weak drivers of evolutionary change, being both rare and rarely 
expressed.  
 
Q2 Why should a reference gene be ‘rarely or never expressed’? 
Penetrance affects the direction of selection because it influences the mirror effect. Genes with or 
without mirror effect can simultaneously generate selection in opposite phenotypic directions 
(Figure 2; Supplementary Material 1). Which direction prevails in the long run depends on how 
genes interact with each other in the cumulative process of multi-locus evolution. Since low 
penetrance implies weak selection, and genic relatedness matches pedigree relatedness for weakly 
selected genes over the genome [10], a reference gene ‘agrees’ with most other genes as to what 
traits best serve their propagation. A reference gene is therefore representative of the ‘evolutionary 
interest’ of the organism. Still, why do we say that a reference gene is ‘rarely or never’ expressed? 
The reason is that slightly different properties are convenient to use in different contexts: in the 
context of measuring an organism’s vehicle quality, a reference gene is best envisaged as a passive 
marker to measure the organism’s causal effects on gene propagation through mechanisms that 
apply even to non-expressed genes. (Intuitively, the effect of a trait on the spread of neutral genes is 
the best measure of the extent to which the trait increases copying of the whole genome.) In the 
context of evolutionary stability, it is useful to envisage a reference gene as being expressed in a 
focal organism but not in its social environment, to then ask: what phenotypic changes could the 
reference gene induce in the organism to propagate more copies of itself (i.e., be positively 
selected) in the given social environment? Put another way, low penetrance genes are particularly 
relevant for adaptation because they essentially affect one organism at a time, and hence are in 
some sense the finest-grained changes that evolution has in its toolbox to optimise organismal 
design. 
 
Q3 Does invoking low-penetrance ‘reference genes’ amount to assuming weak selection, genes of 
small effect size, and hence (approximately) additive interactions among genes?  
No. As commonly understood, the assumptions of weak selection and small effect size mean that 
the entire evolutionary process is driven by genes with these properties. By contrast, we do not even 
assume that low-penetrance genes are common; we merely assume that evolution proceeds in part 
by low-penetrance genes. This makes a crucial difference because, even if evolutionary dynamics 
are largely driven by high-penetrance genes under strong selection, evolutionary stability needs to 
be evaluated with regard to mutant genes that can have any degree of penetrance – including low 
penetrance. From our argument about evolutionary stability (see Q14) this implies that a population 
cannot be evolutionarily stable unless organisms exhibit phenotypes that maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'?.  
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Q4 By invoking the abstraction and idealization of a reference gene, you reach conclusions about 
evolutionary dynamics that are merely heuristic. Why not stick with the precision of standard 
population genetic models? 
Our aim is to understand long-term phenotypic evolution. If we hope to understand this multi-locus 
process by focussing on a single gene (e.g., by adopting the ‘gene’s eye view’ [4]), then that gene’s 
properties should be chosen with that goal in mind - rather than based on what may seem ‘typical’ 
for most genes. Faced with a choice between mathematical precision and biological relevance, we 
think it is better to be approximately right than precisely wrong.  
 
Q5 Why should it matter what outcomes are under an organism’s ‘control’? In other words, why 
should we view causality ‘through the lens’ of a focal organism’s effects? 
The idea of organismal control is intuitively appealing because we all perceive ourselves as 
coherent agents who pursue certain goals through the changes we cause in the world. Our approach 
justifies this intuition as follows. Genes are selected to influence each other because their joint 
effects on the organism they produce mediate their propagation. These co-evolutionary interactions 
between genes can be metaphorically described as a negotiation process, played out over 
evolutionary time, about what phenotype should be expressed. Crucially, this process can only 
shape traits that are at least partly under an organism’s control, in that they can be causally 
influenced by its genes. Such traits include an organism’s propensity to help others, but (in the 
absence of a feasible causal mechanism) not the propensity to receive help, any more than the 
propensity to make the sun shine. This cumulative co-evolutionary process makes organismal 
design goal-directed in that an organism’s causal effects come to reflect its ‘evolutionary interest’.  
 
Q6 Why should we think of selection in terms of causal effects, rather than genotype-fitness (or 
trait-fitness) covariance? 
We are motivated by an interest in long-term outcomes – which requires complementing the 
familiar guiding question: “what kind of gene will be positively selected?” by adding “…, such that 
its phenotypic effect is not eliminated in the long run”. Genotype-fitness covariance is crucial to 
predict short-term change, but it draws no distinction between selection for rogue and adaptive 
genes. Similarly, where trait-fitness covariance does not reflect a causal relationship, it can be 
misleading because it predicts the short-term spreading of maladaptive traits (e.g. as a pleiotropic 
effect of an otherwise useful gene) that are not maintained in the long run because negative 
pleiotropic effect can often be modified by evolution at other loci.  
 
The mirror effect 
 
Q7 Does the mirror effect become unavoidable when a phenotype becomes common, such that 
organisms increasingly face their own phenotype in their social partners? 
No. As defined here, the mirror effect is a property of a gene, not of a phenotype or organism. Even 
if phenotypes are almost completely uniform, a gene making a small difference to the phenotype 
may or may not be simultaneously expressed in interacting relatives. 
 
Q8 Is it plausible that genes without mirror effect exist that affect any given trait? 
For our argument to hold, it only needs to be the case that they can (and eventually will) arise in the 
long run, even in systems where they don’t presently exist. We believe that this is a plausible 
assumption. In general, genes can have any level of penetrance, from 100% to 0%. As we go from 
high to low penetrance, the mirror effect weakens and eventually becomes negligible. For example, 
if a gene is expressed in only 1% of its carriers, an individual expressing it will almost exclusively 
interact with social partners who do not express it. Alternatively, the mirror effect can be avoided 
by genes being expressed conditional on some (perhaps arbitrary) asymmetry between individuals. 
 33 
While theoretical models often exclude conditionality a priori, it is worth noting that conditionality 
in nature should tend to evolve precisely in those circumstances in which the mirror effect 
determines whether a trait is selected for or against; i.e. when individuals can gain from unilaterally 
changing their strategy. An impressive example of natural selection’s power to overcome genetic 
constraints due to the mirror effect is a multicellular body, in which genetically identical cells do 
very different things.  
 
Q9 Does a gene with mirror effect necessarily generate a positive phenotypic correlation between 
interacting relatives? 
No. For example, consider a gene with penetrance P = 0.5 that induces helping in symmetric 
pairwise interactions between relatives. This gene has a moderately strong mirror effect: if both 
individuals have it and the focal individual expresses it, then the non-focal individual also expresses 
it with 50% probability. Nevertheless, if the gene is fixed in the population, observing a focal 
individual’s behaviour reveals no information (beyond the base rate of helping) about the non-focal 
individual’s likely behaviour. Despite behavioural tendencies being perfectly matched, no positive 
correlation arises at the level of actual behaviour. This example illustrates that genes with very low 
penetrance (‘without mirror effect’) are not always needed to overcome a disadvantageous tendency 
of organisms to disproportionally face their own phenotype.  
 
Q10 Are evolutionary ‘end points’ always determined by genes without mirror effect, rather than 
genes with mirror effect? 
No. Sometimes genes with mirror effect invade more easily than those without; sometimes the 
reverse is true (Supplementary Material 1). In both cases, the possible invasion is relevant for what 
population state qualifies as an equilibrium. In that sense, both kinds of genes influence the ‘end 
point’. 𝐼𝐹>)'?, however, is maximised in either case. Why? Because otherwise it would not be an 
‘end point’, as a reference gene that increases 𝐼𝐹>)'? could still invade. Moreover, the view that 
genes without mirror effect are particularly important may be justified by the finding that, under 
some conditions (namely, synergy and additivity), genes with or without mirror effect never 
‘disagree’ about what traits are selected for and there are no MER genes (Supplementary Material 
1). Hence 𝐼𝐹>)'? will end up being maximized even when evolution is entirely driven by genes with 
mirror effect. And under the remaining conditions (interference), genes without mirror effect shape 
the equilibrium because they can invade more easily.  
 
Mirror effect rogue genes 
 
Q11 Can there be an ‘evolutionary arms race’ between MER genes and genes without mirror 
effect? 
No. MER genes are under no selection to resist having their penetrance modified to reduce the 
mirror effect. For example, assume that the full-penetrance defector genes in Fig. 2 come in two 
variants: one that is prone to have its penetrance slightly reduced by a modifier gene, and another 
that resists such modification. Then individuals simultaneously possessing both the modifier gene 
and the modification-prone gene behave, in effect, as if possessing a low-penetrance cooperator 
gene that (sometimes) allows them to reap the benefits of unilateral cooperation. This generates 
selection for proneness to modification, not against it. 
 
Q12 When the “Grafen ESS” is invaded by low-penetrance mutations, could the evolutionary trend 
towards the standard ESS be halted or reversed if high-penetrance mutations arise at a sufficiently 
higher rate than low-penetrance mutations? 
No. The (relative) frequency of low-penetrance mutations should affect the speed, but not the 
general direction of evolution towards the standard ESS. To see why, consider an initially 
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uncooperative population that is invaded by a full-penetrance cooperator gene. As the cooperator 
gene spreads, cooperators increasingly face other cooperators, and become more prone to 
experiencing interference between matching phenotypes (recall that d < 0 is a requirement for the 
Grafen ESS to exist). This tendency to suffer from interference is exacerbated by the mirror effect, 
which eventually stops the spread of cooperation at the Grafen ESS. Genes without mirror effect 
invade the Grafen ESS precisely because they enable their carriers to avoid (and, indeed, reverse) 
the disadvantageous tendency to disproportionally face their own type. When genes without mirror 
effect invade, they therefore weaken the phenotypic correlation in the population. As long as the 
correlation remains positive, individuals that can ‘escape’ the correlation (i.e., that are freed from 
the disadvantageous tendency of disproportionally facing their own phenotype) are better off. 
Hence low-penetrance genes that induce a switch in their carriers’ phenotype continue to enjoy a 
selective advantage. An end point is only reached once the phenotypic correlation in the population 
is zero, which occurs at the standard ESS. Can a high rate of high-penetrance mutations undermine 
this process? No, for the following reason: once the phenotypic correlation R has weakened (i.e., R 
< r), a newly mutated full-penetrance gene (whose phenotypic effect must override all other genes 
to achieve full penetrance) will disadvantage its carriers compared to ‘resident’ individuals of the 
same phenotype. This is so because carriers of a mutant full-penetrance gene suffer more than 
others from the disadvantageous tendency to face their own phenotype. This prevents (re-) invasion 
of full-penetrance genes. Our simulation results illustrate this principle (Supplementary Material 2).  
 
Q13 If the interplay between high- versus low- penetrance genes (unlike between meiotic drive 
versus Mendelian genes) is really a matter of genetic constraints rather than of conflict, doesn’t 
that make the parliament of genes a misleading metaphor? 
In general, we find the metaphor apt for multi-locus evolution because it captures the idea that, 
although various genes may (for whatever reason) pull phenotypic evolution in opposing directions 
in the short term, we can still predict the likely long-term outcomes of adaptation when we consider 
the combined phenotypic effects of many genes. Nevertheless, we concede that the numerical 
imbalance of genes implied by the metaphor is not equally crucial for countering the effects of all 
rogue genes. On the one hand, since meiotic drive genes can always invade anew given appropriate 
mutations, they can fuel endless cycles of invasion and counter-selection in which the majority of 
the genome’s numerical preponderance should play a crucial role. By contrast, since MER genes 
can no longer invade once a population has reached a phenotypic equilibrium (Q12), they do not 
need to be continuously kept in check in that way. 
 
The folk definition of inclusive fitness 
 
Q14 Do you have mathematical proof that 𝐼𝐹>)'? is a phenotypic maximand? 
No, but we have a logical proof that requires no formal mathematics. It is summarised by the 
“argument about evolutionary stability” of section 6. It is a proof by contradiction that rests on the 
incompatibility of three premises:  
(1) The population is phenotypically stable, such that no rare mutant gene can be positively selected 
that encodes a strategy other than the ‘resident’ strategy currently adopted by the majority of 
organisms. 
(2) Each strategy in the strategy set can be encoded by genes with any degree of penetrance 
(including low penetrance); and all feasible mutations arise in the long run.  
(3) Organisms adopting the resident strategy do not behave as if to maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'?. 
 
We begin by noting that the statement “the organism behaves as if to maximise its 𝐼𝐹>)'?” is 
equivalent to the statement “the organism behaves as if to maximise the propagation of a rare, low-
penetrance gene”. This equivalence stems from the definition of vehicle quality as the sum of an 
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organism’s causal effects on the propagation of a low-penetrance gene, and from vehicle quality 
being proportional to 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Next, envisage a mutation of a previously neutral, low-penetrance 
gene, which, when expressed, changes the focal organism’s strategy so that it behaves as if to 
maximise the propagation of a low-penetrance gene. Premises (2) and (3) ensure that such a 
mutation will eventually arise. Since it is true by assumption that the mutant gene did something to 
improve its propagation success, it must be positively selected (however weakly). And since the 
mutated gene achieved this by inducing a phenotypic change, premise 1 is violated. Hence premises 
(1) - (3) cannot be met simultaneously.    
 
Q15 Does calculating a focal gene’s causal effect on 𝐼𝐹>)'? (compared to the counterfactual 𝐼𝐹K>)'?) 
establish the direction of selection on that gene? 
No. Positive selection for a (weakly selected, Mendelian) gene can be inferred if expressing it 
increases the focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?, but rogue genes that reduce 𝐼𝐹>)'? can also be selected for. We 
illustrate this with an example based on the model of Supplementary Material 1. A rare full-
penetrance cooperator gene is positively selected if  𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑑) > 𝑐     (7). 
On the other hand, 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] − 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] > 0 yields  𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑) > 𝑐   (8) 
as the condition where expressing the focal gene causally increases 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Here, 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] = 	𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 − 𝑐 + 𝑓(𝑏 + 𝑑) + 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑓𝑑); 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] = 𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 + 𝑓𝑏; and 
f is replaced by r (because f matches r for a rare full-penetrance gene). Given synergy or additivity 
(𝑑 ≥ 0), condition (8) is always met when condition (7) is met, meaning that expressing a 
positively selected gene increases 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Given interference (d < 0), however, condition (7) can be 
met even while 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] − 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] < 0, i.e. while 𝑟(𝑏 + 𝑑 + 𝑟𝑑) < 𝑐   (9). 
When conditions (7) and (9) hold simultaneously, the focal gene is selected for despite its 
expression decreasing 𝐼𝐹>)'?. In short, the gene is a mirror effect rogue gene that opposes the 
evolutionary trend towards increased 𝐼𝐹>)'?. This situation, however, generates selection for any 
low-penetrance modifier gene that would prevent the focal cooperator gene from being expressed. 
Such a modifier, when expressed, will cause the focal organism to have 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] instead of 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate]. The resultant change is positive (i.e. 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] − 𝐼𝐹>)'?[cooperate] > 0, 
implying selection for the modifier) whenever condition (9) holds; i.e., whenever expressing the 
cooperator gene reduces 𝐼𝐹>)'? in the first place. This illustrates the principle that genes which 
reduce 𝐼𝐹>)'? face counter-selection in the long run. 
 
Q16 Should evolution proceed towards phenotypes with higher 𝐼𝐹>)'? in a frequency-independent 
manner? 
No. 𝐼𝐹>)'? is evaluated in a given (social) environment, which changes as phenotype frequencies 
change. So, a general trend towards phenotypes with higher 𝐼𝐹>)'? is fully compatible with 
frequency-dependent selection (see Supplementary Material 1 for examples). Although a frequency-
dependent trait might either increase or decrease 𝐼𝐹>)'? in different circumstances, this does not 
preclude (barring rogue genes) a selective trend at each point in time towards phenotypes yielding 
higher 𝐼𝐹>)'?.  
 
Q17 When counting reference gene copies that come into existence because the focal individual 
exists, one implicitly invokes the counterfactual possibility that it does not exist. How should this 
apparently rather far-fetched possibility be interpreted? 
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To predict which phenotype should evolve among a set of alternatives, it is sufficient to consider 
the differences in 𝐼𝐹>)'? among the immediate alternatives. For example, to check if an action 
performed at time t increases an organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?, all causal effects of the organism’s existence up 
to time t can be taken as given. This does not require measuring 𝐼𝐹>)'? in absolute terms, and so 
does not invoke the idea of a focal organism’s non-existence. Nevertheless, to preserve the full 
power of Hamilton’s idea that organisms are adapted to maximise their IF, it seems desirable that 
IF also be measurable in absolute terms (at least in principle; but see Q25), which is why we invoke 
‘non-existence’ as a reference point. The biological justification is as follows: for a freshly 
conceived embryo, it should be mechanistically possible to self-abort instead of develop. And if the 
chances of success of continued development are slim, this could be an adaptive strategy. For 
example, if an embryo detects internal physiological clues that indicate major developmental 
problems, self-abortion could allow its mother to have another offspring sooner. The inclusive 
fitness outcome of immediate self-abortion thus sets a baseline (i.e., 𝐼𝐹>)'? = 0), which an organism 
must improve upon to make its continued existence adaptive. This is a variation on Dawkins’ [20] 
view: “We could compare the effects of his choosing to perform act X rather than act Y. Or we 
could take the effects of his lifetime’s set of deeds and compare them with a hypothetical lifetime of 
total inaction – as though he had never been conceived. It is this latter usage that is normally meant 
by the inclusive fitness of an individual organism.”  
 
Q18 Why think of 𝐼𝐹>)'? as an absolute property of an organism, rather than consider only 
differences in 𝐼𝐹>)'? between phenotypes? After all, natural selection works on differences. 
This is partly a matter of taste. We have heard this objection from theoreticians, whereas 
empirically minded people readily embrace the ‘absolute property’ viewpoint. To see why, consider 
a hypothetical non-social species for which 𝐼𝐹>)'? is simply a count of the number of offspring an 
individual produces. Should we tell biologists studying this species that counting offspring is 
meaningless, because all that matters are differences? That could be seen as confusing because 
absolute quantities must exist before differences can be calculated. If we wish to understand this 
hypothetical species’ adaptations, our working hypothesis should be that any putatively adaptive 
trait increases its bearer’s number of offspring. This makes absolute offspring number a meaningful 
quantity. If we wish to invoke organismal adaptation as an optimising force, we need to articulate 
what is being optimised. 
 
Q19 Do you predict real organisms to be perfectly adapted to maximise their 𝐼𝐹>)'??  
No. We don’t expect perfection in nature. But the notion of an ‘optimal’ phenotype is useful to 
generate testable predictions, and as a reference to distinguish adaptive from non-adaptive traits. 
Nor do we claim that an optimality approach captures all interesting biological phenomena. But 
whenever we wish to use optimality, which is commonplace in evolutionary ecology, we must be 
prepared to answer the question: “optimal for what”? Our proposed answer is: “optimal for 
maximising the organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?”. And we are unaware of a similarly general alternative answer.  
 
Q20 You define 𝐼𝐹>)'? so that a reference gene that increases an organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? is positively 
selected by definition. Then you predict that organisms should evolve towards maximising 𝐼𝐹>)'?. 
Isn’t that a circular argument? 
No. If the argument were circular, the prediction would necessarily, albeit trivially, be true. This is 
not the case: at least in principle, our prediction might not fit patterns in the real world, depending 
on, among other things, mechanistic constraints limiting adaptation; environmental changes limiting 
the fit between organisms and their environment; and, most importantly, the (approximate) truth of 
our postulate that reference genes are useful for predicting phenotypic evolution. 
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Q21 According to West & Gardner [3], a phenotypic maximand must be under the organism’s ‘full 
control’, because organisms can only appear designed to maximise something they can control. 
Doesn’t that exclude 𝐼𝐹>)'? , which is in part controlled by others? 
The requirement of ‘full’, if taken to mean exclusive, control is unnecessary because a consequence 
can have several causes. For example, if A and B must both occur to bring about C, then an 
organism that controls A can have a causal effect on C whenever B occurs - regardless of its control 
of B. Nevertheless, we agree with West and Gardner’s main conclusion about ‘control’: namely, 
that neighbour-modulated fitness does not qualify as a phenotypic maximand (see Supplementary 
Material 4). 
 
Q22 Another way to describe the ‘double accounting problem’ that allegedly plagues 𝐼𝐹>)'? is that 
“it allows children to be counted many times, as though they had many existences” [20]. Is that a 
valid concern?  
No. Since a given causal effect may have several causes (see Q21), summing each individual 
organism’s causal effects on reproduction need not equal the population’s total reproduction. For 
example, if organisms A and B must cooperate to jointly produce n offspring, then A’s decision to 
cooperate causes n (instead of 0) offspring to exist. And so too does B’s decision to cooperate. Yet 
these statements do not conflict with the premise that the total number of offspring is n, not 2n. The 
key point is that considering one cause at a time does not entail a commitment to adding up the 
consequences of different causes. While it is meaningful to evaluate a focal organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'? in a 
given environment (i.e., keeping all but the focal organisms’ phenotype constant), it is not 
meaningful to add up the inclusive fitnesses of all population members. To be sure, the above 
argument does not directly speak to the validity of our claim that 𝐼𝐹>)'? is a phenotypic maximand. 
Instead, it merely serves to show that 𝐼𝐹>)'? is defined free of this alleged logical contradiction.  
 
Q23 With hindsight it seems quite intuitive that organisms should maximise 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Has no-one 
explicitly argued for this before? 
Not that we are aware of. Queller [13] came close to our conclusion in his discussion of Creel’s 
paradox. But he stopped short because he treated inclusive fitness as an accounting tool for a focal 
gene, not as a phenotypic maximand of an organism. In particularly, he recognised that a gene ‘for’ 
becoming the breeder is favoured because, when considering selection at a focal locus, there is no 
reason to ‘strip’ the effects of genes at other loci. He also noted that selection for preferring to 
become the breeder is inconsistent with maximisation of IFHamilton. But he did not say what is being 
maximised instead.  
 
Q24 If most biologists have intuitively thought about inclusive fitness correctly, does it really matter 
if we now call it the ‘folk definition of inclusive fitness’? 
No. We hope that 𝐼𝐹>)'? will become known as ‘inclusive fitness’, whereas 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* will become 
a historical footnote. We believe this would be consistent with Hamilton’s original motivation for 
coining the term: to generalise the classic idea of ‘fitness’ as the property of an organism which 
natural selection tends to maximise. This idea has been extremely powerful and continues to play a 
central role in evolutionary explanations that make sense to broad audiences, rather than only to 
mathematically inclined specialists. It has motivated countless empirical studies that attempt to 
quantify selection on social behaviours. In part, our motivation for revisiting the definition of 
inclusive fitness has been to ensure agreement between the ways that empiricists and theoreticians 
explain why evolution had led to certain types of traits predominating in nature.  
 
Q25 How should empiricists measure 𝐼𝐹>)'??   
We see little reason to attempt to measure 𝐼𝐹>)'? in absolute terms. To test whether a social trait 
increases an organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?, one should test whether the trait’s causal effects meet Hamilton’s 
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phenotypic rule (supplementary material 3). Ideally, one should measure these effects 
experimentally, by comparing manipulated individuals with control individuals inhabiting closely 
matched social environments. Then, all systematic differences between treatments with respect to 
the reproductive success of the focal organism and its relatives can be causally attributed to the 
focal trait. Crucially, in contrast to tests inspired by 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* (review: [48]), there is no need to 
assume that traits have additive effects. We emphasise that, since 𝐼𝐹>)'? should be measured in a 
given environment, one should not manipulate multiple individuals that directly interact with each 
other. For example, by forcing two interacting individuals to cooperate in a prisoner’s dilemma, one 
would increase the 𝐼𝐹>)'? of both. But this manipulation would be uninformative as to whether 
cooperating (instead of defecting) increases each individual organism’s 𝐼𝐹>)'?. 
 
Q26 Is 𝐼𝐹>)'? the unique quantity that qualifies as a phenotypic maximand? 
No. As noted by Okasha & Martens [25], for any given function that qualifies as a phenotypic 
maximand there exist infinitely many transformations that also qualify. So if 𝐼𝐹>)'? is a maximand, 
then so is any function 𝐹 = 𝐼𝐹>)'? + 𝑥, where x is a constant on which the focal organism has no 
causal effect. For example, if all “effects due to the social environment” can be deemed beyond a 
focal organism’s control, then denoting these as −𝑥 recovers 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* from 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Similarly, 
letting x be the reproduction of relatives that is unaffected by the focal organism recovers the 
‘simple weighted sum’ definition of inclusive fitness (𝐼𝐹), which adds up the reproduction of a 
focal organism and all its relatives, weighted by relatedness. Although Grafen [16] rejected 𝐼𝐹, 
Okasha & Martens [25] found that 𝐼𝐹 in fact qualifies as a phenotypic maximand, at least under 
the same conditions as 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()*. Moreover, the above argument implies that 𝐼𝐹 qualifies under 
even broader conditions, namely under the same conditions as 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Nevertheless, we advise 
against using 𝐼𝐹 because it diverts attention from the causal processes that matter. For example, 
any comparison of 𝐼𝐹 between individuals differing in their number of relatives is confounded 
by the latter. 
 
Q27 How should we interpret Okasha & Martens’ [25] result that a quantity they call “Grafen 
1979 payoff” qualifies as a phenotypic maximand under broader conditions than 𝐼𝐹? 
This result reflects the restrictive assumption that genes with incomplete penetrance do not exist. 
The “Grafen 1979 payoff” function is given by 𝑈(𝑖, 𝑗) = 𝑟𝑉(𝑖, 𝑖) + (1 − 𝑟)𝑉(𝑖, 𝑗), where 𝑉(𝑖, 𝑖) is 
a focal individual’s (hypothetical) payoff if it were to play against its own strategy; 𝑉(𝑖, 𝑗) is its 
actual payoff playing against a non-focal individual; and r is relatedness. Okasha & Martens’ result 
states that, at evolutionary equilibrium, each individual should behave as if to maximise U. The 
rationale is as follows. Consider a rare mutant gene that is always expressed and that fully specifies 
an individual’s strategy. Carriers of this mutant gene experience payoff 𝑉(𝑖, 𝑖) with probability r, 
and 𝑉(𝑖, 𝑗) with probability (1 - r). Thus, since the “Grafen 1979 payoff” equals the expected payoff 
(neighbour-modulated fitness) of a mutant gene’s carriers, there is scope for a mutant gene to 
invade (i.e., to increase the reproductive success of its carriers) whenever the population is not in a 
state where its members maximise U. But this rationale hinges on the assumption that strategies are 
fully specified by a single gene that is always expressed. Without that assumption, it is not the case 
that carriers of a rare mutant gene face their own strategy with probability r. Indeed, we show in 
Supplementary Materials 1& 2 that the strategy (i.e., the ‘Grafen ESS’) which maximises U is 
unstable when genes with incomplete penetrance exist.  
 
Q28 Natural selection can be said to maximise a gene’s inclusive fitness effect (IFE) in the sense 
that, at each locus, the allele in a set of possible alleles that has the highest IFE should end up 
being present at equilibrium. Is that the same as 𝐼𝐹>)'? being maximised?  
No. Selection at a given locus, with a given set of alleles, does not imply maximising-behaviour of 
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individuals (see Fig. 2). Hence the meaning of the phrase “inclusive fitness is maximised” is 
obscured whenever authors fail to distinguish between a gene’s IFE and an individual’s IF . 
 
Hamilton’s inclusive fitness 
 
Q29 In the formal part of his paper, Hamilton [6] defines IF simply as 1 + IFE, where IFE is the 
focal gene’s inclusive fitness effect. This formulation implies that IF is maximised whenever IFE is 
maximised. Doesn’t that contradict the view that there is a deep conceptual distinction between IF 
(as a property of an organism) and IFE (as a property of a gene or trait)?  
No. Hamilton used this definition in a specific model in which baseline fitness was 1 and all social 
effects were attributable to a single gene. Hence, in this special case, it makes no difference whether 
IF is thought of as capturing the causal effects of an entire organism or a single gene. In general, 
however, Hamilton stated repeatedly (e.g. see the quote in our introduction) that he intended IF to 
capture the causal effects of an organism. It is worth adding that, regardless of Hamilton’s original 
intentions, we intend 𝐼𝐹>)'? to capture the causal effects of an organism as a whole. 
 
Q30 Is calculating a focal helping gene’s causal effect on 𝐼𝐹>)'? (compared to the counterfactual 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect]) equivalent to Hamilton’s ‘stripping procedure’? 
No. If a focal cooperator receives benefit b + d from another cooperator (see Supplementary 
Material 3), then subtracting 𝐼𝐹K>)'?[defect] excludes only the b but not the d from the resultant 
causal effect. This is because only the b is received irrespective of the focal individual’s phenotype. 
By contrast, according to Hamilton, “all components [i.e., both b and d] which can be considered as 
due to the individual’s social environment” should be excluded. We note that 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* has the 
unusual property of being mathematically designed to exclude components that are attributable to 
non-focal causes. Since 𝐼𝐹>)'? does not share this property, it behaves more like variables with 
which empirical biologists are familiar. For example, when we state that a fertilizer has effect x on 
plant height, we are not tempted to re-define plant height to exclude components caused by other 
factors like the rainfall. Instead, we avoid confounding factors by performing controlled 
experiments to isolate the effect of the fertilizer: i.e., we measure the fertiliser’s effect in a given 
environment. Likewise, causal effects on 𝐼𝐹>)'? should be measured in a given environment. 
 
Q31 The claim that the prescribed ‘stripping’ of fitness components is problematic for the use of 
inclusive fitness seems at odds with a lack of theoretical studies that involve ‘stripping’. Why?  
Because the ‘stripping’ is not done explicitly – not even in Hamilton’s original study [6]. Instead, in 
practice, double accounting is avoided by using neighbour-modulated fitness. The ‘stripping’ then 
happens implicitly, when an expression for neighbour-modulated fitness is re-interpreted as 
inclusive fitness. Specifically, re-interpreting rb as a benefit provided (rather than received) results 
in an expression that contains no received benefits, so that it appears to have been stripped of them. 
This ‘implicit stripping’ is unproblematic in that an inclusive fitness effect, once correctly 
calculated from neighbour-modulated fitness, correctly predicts selection regardless of its verbal 
interpretation. By contrast, the explicit ‘stripping’ prescribed in Hamilton’s definition of 𝐼𝐹#$%&'()* 
reflects the (unjustified) idea that, to be consistent, the same principle (i.e., that effects due to the 
social environment be ‘stripped’) must apply equally to effects of whole organisms and of 
individual genes.  
 
Scope of the theory 
 
Q32 More often than not, causal effects in biology are probabilistic not deterministic. How do you 
account for that? 
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By causal effects of an organism we mean expected (arithmetic mean) effects. Thus, when we say 
that organisms are selected to maximize 𝐼𝐹>)'?, we really mean their expected 𝐼𝐹>)'?. Perhaps 
surprisingly, this is appropriate even in fluctuating environments, which are often said to select for 
genotypes with high geometric mean success (‘bet-hedging’) [49,50]. The apparent contradiction 
between arithmetic and geometric mean success disappears once one realizes that an evolutionarily 
relevant measure of reproductive success must account for offspring reproductive value: what 
matters is not just the number of offspring, but the sum of their reproductive value [8]. In a 
fluctuating environment, each offspring’s reproductive value depends on the context: in a bad year, 
where population size is small, each offspring is more valuable (i.e., it is a bigger share of the 
population) than in a good year, where population size is large. Once this is accounted for, 
organisms are selected to maximize arithmetic mean success even in fluctuating environments 
[8]. In our argument, the possibility of fluctuating environments (and of sustained positive or 
negative population growth) is implicitly accounted for by weighting offspring by reproductive 
value. 
 
Q33 In the statement that “organisms should maximize their expected 𝐼𝐹>)'?”, over what range of 
possibilities is the expectation to be taken? Over a given individual’s future possibilities, or over all 
possibilities that a randomly chosen individual at conception may face in its life? 
Both types of expectation should be maximized – at least insofar as traits are concerned that can be 
modified throughout life at low cost (e.g. behaviour). On the one hand, natural selection shapes 
phenotypic strategies that specify what phenotype to exhibit in given circumstances. Each organism 
is endowed with such a (genetically specified) strategy at conception. If one strategy consistently 
outperforms its alternatives (i.e., yields higher expected 𝐼𝐹>)'? at conception), it will spread because 
genes contributing to it enjoy higher propagation success. Ultimately, this makes expected 𝐼𝐹>)'? at 
conception the relevant criterion for selection. On the other hand, a strategy’s expected 𝐼𝐹>)'? at 
conception is maximised if each organism adopting it behaves optimally in its local circumstances 
(i.e., if, within its limits in perception and flexibility, it maximizes its own expected 𝐼𝐹>)'?). 
Analogous to standard (non-social) theory of dynamic optimisation [51], organisms should 
therefore behave at all times as if to maximise the portion of their expected 𝐼𝐹>)'? that is still in the 
future (i.e., their inclusive reproductive value).  
 
Q34 How do you account for so-called ‘cancellation effects’ [26,46,47] due to local competition? 
Cancellation effects arise when relatives compete for limited reproductive opportunities. For 
example, helping your sister to produce a niece is not a good way to propagate your genes if the 
niece subsequently competes with your daughter for a single breeding opportunity. In our definition 
of vehicle quality, this is implicitly accounted for when offspring are weighted by their reproductive 
value: if the niece and daughter each have a 50% chance of winning the single breeding 
opportunity, then the niece’s existence reduces the daughter’s reproductive value by half.  
 
Q35 Are you suggesting we should change our methods of modelling social evolution? 
Not necessarily. In particular, our theory is consistent with the Taylor-Frank method and the 
corresponding ‘inclusive fitness method’ of Taylor et al. [31]. We note, however, that these 
methods are conceptually based on the idea of an accounting tool for genes of small effect size 
only, whereas one can directly invoke 𝐼𝐹>)'? as a phenotypic maximand. Indeed, this latter option 
was suggested long ago by Maynard Smith [52] for game-theory and optimisation models. 
Concerns about this method by Grafen [24] led to its demise, but they are based on misleading 
results caused by mirror effect rogue genes. If we are only interested in phenotypic outcomes with 
long-term stability [28], these concerns disappear (Fig. 2, Supplementary Material 1-2). Invoking 𝐼𝐹>)'? as a maximand has the practical advantage of allowing a broader range of optimisation 
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techniques to be used (e.g., dynamic programming [53]), which – unlike the Taylor-Frank method – 
are not limited to (locally) optimising one continuous trait at a time.  
 
Levels of selection 
 
Q36 What advantage does an ‘organismal’ view of evolution have over a purely ‘gene-centred’ 
view that focusses only on what kinds of genes can be selected for? 
We think a good part of Darwin’s key insight about the design-like appearance of organisms 
remains unaccounted for if we consider only one gene at a time. Gene-level theories do not, by 
themselves, explain complex organismal design. They need to be complemented with a higher-level 
principle that tends to lead phenotypic contributions of individual genes in a coherent direction: 
namely, towards better-adapted organisms. Without such a principle, complex organismal design 
has to be regarded as a purely incidental – and hence ultimately unexplained – by-product of gene-
level selection. Dawkins [20] came close to acknowledging this when he wrote: “Fundamentally, 
what is going on is that replicating molecules ensure their survival by means of phenotypic effects 
on the world. It is only incidentally true that those phenotypic effects happen to be packaged up into 
units called individual organisms. We do not at present appreciate the organism for the remarkable 
phenomenon it is. We are accustomed to asking, of any widespread biological phenomenon, ‘What 
is its survival value?’ But we do not say, ‘What is the survival value of packaging life up into 
discrete units called organisms?’ We accept it as a given feature of the way life is. […] I am not 
necessarily objecting to this focus of attention on individual organisms, merely calling attention to it 
as something that we take for granted. Perhaps we should stop taking it for granted and start 
wondering about the individual organism, as something that needs explaining in its own right, just 
as we found sexual reproduction to be something that needs explaining in its own right.”  
 
Q37 Isn’t it wrong to assume (as criticised by Dawkins [20]) “that an individual organism, as a 
coherent entity, works on behalf of copies of all the genes inside it”? 
Not necessarily. It will still be the case that organisms usually work as coherent entities, if long-
term evolution tends to shape organisms that happen to act in such a way. In the words of Mayr 
[54], “When entities are combined at a higher level of integration, not all the properties of the new 
entity are necessarily a logical or predictable consequence of the properties of the components.” 
Invoking coherent evolutionary interests of individuals is a useful heuristic to the extent that 
neglected details (e.g., the occurrence of rogue genes) tend not to have lasting effects on organismal 
design. 
 
Q38 Is the individual organism the unique level in the hierarchy of life at which natural selection 
can be said to optimise performance (i.e., vehicle quality, inclusive fitness)? 
No. In principle, the concept of vehicle quality can be applied at any level of biological 
organization. One can always ask: what characteristics make entity X a good vehicle for gene 
propagation? For example, in a multicellular body of clonal cells, each cell will maximize its (cell 
level) vehicle quality by playing its part in building a coherent body that, in turn, maximizes its 
(organism level) vehicle quality. Similarly, if eusocial colonies (‘superorganisms’) have strong 
control mechanisms against selfishness to quickly eliminate all incipient ‘rogue’ traits (thus 
rendering selfish adaptations effectively impossible), then, like cells in a body, the organisms in a 
superorganism should become adapted to maximise their vehicle quality through maximizing the 
superorganism’s vehicle quality. However, control mechanisms against ‘rogue traits’ probably arise 
more easily at the organism than superorganism level. For example, consider an organismal 
adaptation that involves a network of genes that interact in a coordinated fashion to produce a 
coherent outcome. This network operates in a biochemical environment that is readily accessible to 
gene products from all the other genes of the organism. This accessibility creates thousands of 
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possibilities for mutations to undermine the adaptation. Moreover, the mechanisms doing the 
undermining could be as simple and low-cost as one protein binding to another, rather than needing 
to be complex adaptations in their own right. This makes complex ‘rogue adaptations’ within 
organisms extremely unlikely. By contrast, because these arguments do not apply to the same extent 
to superorganisms, there is less reason to expect a priori that adaptations improve vehicle quality at 
the superorganism level. 
 
Q39 Does the kinship theory of genomic imprinting, which posits that evolutionary interests may 
differ between paternally versus maternally-derived genes, contradict the idea that an individual’s 
genome has a ‘majority interest’? 
No. Imprinting may cause deviations from an individual’s optimal phenotype, but it does not negate 
the usefulness of defining an optimum. To a first approximation, imprinting can be understood as a 
manifestation of a conflict of interests between organisms – namely between parents or between 
parents and offspring – played out within the offspring’s genomes [55,56]. In addition, maternally 
and paternally imprinted genes have interests of their own, favouring (i.e. being best propagated by) 
phenotypes that differ from the optima of any of the organisms involved [57]. Although the 
interplay of these interests should cause fluctuations in the evolutionary trajectory of offspring 
phenotypes, it seems questionable whether the influence of the relatively small number of imprinted 
loci, which “pull” phenotypic evolution in opposing directions, is anywhere near as strong as that 
due to the unimprinted majority of genes, in shaping phenotypes through cumulative multi-locus 
evolution. We might expect that, in general, offspring will exhibit a phenotype (e.g. nutritional 
demand) close to their own optimum. Note that this view is consistent with the persistence of 
imprinting even after its phenotypic effects have been eliminated. For example, if a growth factor 
locus is silent when maternally imprinted yet is highly expressed when paternally imprinted, 
selection on unimprinted genes may (re-)establish the optimum offspring phenotype by affecting 
downstream mechanisms activated by the growth factor.  
 
Q40 Do you have anything to add for readers who are still sceptical? 
A thought experiment might help. Imagine you are a bioengineer in the distant future, when one can 
change organisms by rewriting their DNA. Assume you are faced with the following task. In your 
lab you have numerous animal embryos, each of them individually taken from a wild mother from a 
separate source population. The embryos are sequenced and, by comparison with their source 
populations, all alleles are identified that match the definition of a reference gene (i.e., that are 
rarely or never expressed, and rare in the source population). Your task is to modify each embryo’s 
somatic DNA (but not the germline) to create an animal that will increase the average population-
wide frequency of its reference genes as much as possible. The modified embryos will then be 
implanted back into their mothers to continue their development. Essentially, your goal is to design 
organisms that are good at propagating low-penetrance genes. Your success will be measured by 
recording future gene frequencies. A number of useful observations follow:  
(i) There is an objective sense in which some organismal designs are better than others to 
advance your goal.  
(ii) In each population, the focal embryo is the only lever you can pull to affect the target 
variable.  
(iii) If a focal organism dies early on, that amounts to fewer reference gene copies (i.e., a cost). 
And if a focal organism helps its sibling to produce > 2 nieces or nephews, at a cost of one 
of its own offspring, that is a net benefit. And so forth. To optimise traits for their cost-
benefit balance, none of the focal organism’s offspring should be neglected (‘stripped’), 
because they all have the same potential to contribute to your goal.  
(iv) Designing animals that dramatically outperform wild-type animals won’t be easy. Your best 
bet may be to build a marginally improved animal (e.g. with a few immune genes added to 
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increase survival), or to use a qualitatively different design that could not have evolved 
gradually. There should be little potential to improve the design by adjusting quantitative 
traits, because natural selection would already have done so.  
(v) Now envisage a design D that outperforms wild-type animals, and that could plausibly have 
arisen by a natural mutation. How would selection act on a low-penetrance germline 
mutation that happens to induce D? Answer: it would be positively selected by the same 
mechanism that D was designed to optimize.  
(vi) Hence, only populations in which wild-type animals are optimized to propagate their low-
penetrance genes can be phenotypically stable. 
